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Abstract

Is there support for voluntary sterilization incentives in the U.S.? Nine semi-structured
interviews were conducted with a snowball sample of four families spanning three generations in
Bucktown, a 95% white, middle-class neighborhood which sent David Duke, former Grand
Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, to the Louisiana House of Representatives in 1989. Interviews
explain support and opposition to current Louisiana State Representative John LaBruzzo‟s policy
suggestion to “end generational welfare” by offering citizens $1000 in exchange for having their
fallopian tubes tied or receiving vasectomies. Most respondents expressed that the sterilization
proposal was targeted at low-income blacks. Although work ethic deficiency was used to frame
poverty and welfare-dependency, support and opposition for the proposal was ultimately divided
along racial ideological lines. Although Bucktonians have disassociated themselves from Duke
and are upwardly mobile socio-economically, right-wing populist ideology remains salient.

Key Words: right-wing populism, producerism, racial ideology, welfare attitudes, Bucktown
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Introduction
In February 1989, Louisiana Legislative District 81 gained national notoriety for electing
David Duke, a former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan and Nazi sympathizer. Duke, a rightwing populist running on a campaign of anti-government-interventionism and white rights, drew
strong support in the precincts comprising Bucktown, a former fishing village. District 81
remained outside of the national spotlight until September 2008, when District 81 Representative
John LaBruzzo suggested paying low-income, less educated people $1,000 to have vasectomies
and tubal ligations, as well as subsidize fertility amongst more affluent, more educated citizens.
This provoked formal and informal censure from Catholic Archbishop Schultze, Republican and
Democratic colleagues, Governor Bobby Jindal and many constituents. Many opponents
interpreted the sterilization incentive as a eugenicist attack on low-income blacks who are
overrepresented among the poor. Proponents and opponents alike interpreted it as an attack on
the current state of the welfare system.
This study investigates John LaBruzzo‟s anachronistic proposal to trim welfare costs and
to halt the cycle of generational welfare-dependency by incentivizing decreased fertility among
welfare recipients. Because public sterilization incentives for welfare recipients are not
frequently offered in contemporary America, previous studies have not addressed attitudes
towards them. Plenty of studies, however, address Americans‟ attitudes towards means-tested
welfare (Feldman 1982; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Groskind 1994; Schneider and Jacoby
2005; Gainousss 2008, and many others). These studies assert that attitudes toward means-tested
welfare are a function of political ideology, attitudes toward welfare recipients, racial attitudes,
race of respondent and self-interest. Taking guidance from these studies of attitudes toward
means-tested welfare, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a snowball sample of nine
1

Bucktonians from four families, spanning three generations, to determine whether support exists
for Rep. LaBruzzo‟s sterilization proposal and why such support exists.
More central to this study is the examination of theories of American right-wing
populism (Federici 1991; Berlet and Lyons 2000) through the case of support and opposition to
John LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive in Bucktown. Respondents‟ explanations for welfaredependency were ideological, rather than factual. Findings suggest that a combination of
individualism (Federici 1991), work ethic ideology (Berlet and Lyons 2000) and color-blind
racial ideology (Bonilla-Silva 2003) create an environment for LaBruzzo‟s generational welfaredependency frame to resonate. Although Rep. LaBruzzo‟s generational welfare-dependency
frame resonated with the respondents‟ right-wing populist ideology, support and opposition for
the proposal was divided along racial ideological lines. Thus, where theories of American rightwing populism leave us, Bonilla Silva‟s (2003) color-blind racial frames pick us up. Those who
were more likely to support the proposal perceived it as presenting a choice for the recipients,
viewed the proposal as reasonable rather than racist, used cultural racial frames to explain
poverty, and interpreted equality of opportunity through the lens of formal equality.
In addition to examining theories of American right-wing populism (Federici 1991;
Berlet and Lyons 2000) by applying them to the case of Bucktown, this study aims to contribute
to literature on American right-wing populism by giving a voice to the people rather than just
examining the rhetoric of right-wing populist leaders or accounts of historic events.
This study is particularly relevant at this moment in American history when Republicans
are searching for frames that resonate. Louisiana had the highest voting percentage of any state
for John McCain in the 2008 presidential election. Bucktown, a suburban Louisiana
neighborhood, presents an ideal setting to examine right-wing populist responses to a
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government that conservatives like Rep. John LaBruzzo believe is “going socialist…under
Barack Obama” and the Democratic Supermajority.
In the next sections, the concepts of ideology and frames are clarified. Then, literature on
American right-wing populism and color-blind racial frames are discussed. Next, methods are
explained. Afterwards, Bucktown is placed within a socio-historical context. Finally, findings are
discussed and conclusions are drawn.
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Ideology
The term “ideology” is used in numerous different ways to explain social and political
phenomena. I make three points of clarification before I refer to “ideology” throughout this study
of American anti-welfare right-wing populism.
First, ideologies are operating group realities posing as absolute truths (Mannheim 1936).
What is true at one time and place is not necessarily true during another time and place in
history. Because of the difficulty of knowing what is true in every place at every time, people
cling to their understandings of social phenomena although they are constantly in flux. Thus,
beliefs exist that transcend the current social reality. Most groups will not admit that their beliefs
are ideological; rather, they operate on the unconscious level1.
Second, ideologies provide explanations for groups to understand social reality in a
manner that serves their interests and/or are congruent their values. These situationally
transcendant beliefs have the ability to withstand competing authoritative, logical and empirical
explanations for social reality because of their social functions beyond simply specifying cause
and effect relationships (Mannheim 1936; Campbell 2000; Van Dijk 2006). By combining
“assertions and theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant to
promoting or resisting social change” (Oliver and Johnston 2000:43), ideology functions to
promote or challenge the status quo. Studying beliefs as ideology uncovers the implicit value
judgments underpinning all seemingly value-free interpretations of social reality. Hence the
negative sanctions for those who express beliefs that contradict those of ideological
communities.
Third, different socialization and education will result in the diffusion of varying ideas,
thus yielding disparate ideologies. Ideologies are gradually acquired and gradually disintegrated
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through exposure to various discourses throughout one‟s life (Van Dijk 2006). Ideologies are
fluid, socially shared, core beliefs that inform peripheral beliefs (Jost 2006; Van Dijk 2006).
Oliver and Johnston (2000) suggest that if we shed more light on how ideologies and frames are
connected, it will improve our understanding of political culture.

End Notes
1 The unconscious mind refers to memories that may not be remembered in the present, but are
nevertheless accessible to consciousness at a later time.
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Frames
Frames are discursive structures that describe what social reality is and ought to be by
suggesting the essence of an issue (Nelson and Kinder 1996). They originate from and also affect
ideologies (Oliver and Johnston 2000). In this section, I will draw upon social movement,
political communication and social psychological scholars to briefly explain framing theory
(Snow 1988; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Nelson, Oxley, Clawson 1997; Benford and Snow 2000;
Oliver and Johnston 2000; Druckman 2001; Snow and Benford 2005).
Benford and Snow (2000) outline two core features of framing that affect policy debates
– framing tasks and frame resonance. Framing tasks include (a) diagnosis, (b) prognosis and (c)
motivation (Snow 1988; Wilson 1973). Diagnostic framing identifies the problem. Prognostic
framing articulates a proposed solution and asserts a “strategy for carrying out a plan” (Benford
and Snow 2000: 617). Motivational framing provides a “rationale for engaging in ameliorative
collective action” (Benford and Snow 2000: 617).
Frames often take the form of strategic discursive structures, that is, they are used by
social movement organizations (SMOs) or elites to help people see things their way. Elites and
social movement organizations use framing, as well as priming and persuasion, to serve their
interests. Priming refers to repeated exposure to an idea, often through the media. Persuasion
tries to get people to think of a policy as good instead of bad, whereas framing aims to get people
to emphasize a different aspect of a policy, regardless of whether they think it is good or bad
(Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997). This is done by diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational
framing in a matter receptive to an ideological community or, sometimes, in a manner that
transforms an ideology. Frame resonance is the effectiveness of a frame to tap into an
ideological community.
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When the correct diagnosis, prognosis and motivation for a social problem are heavily
contested, frames have a greater ability to exert effects by suggesting what the essence of an
issue is (Nelson and Kinder 1996). Thus, “frames provide direction for temporarily resolving the
uncertainty in opinion born of ambivalence by dispensing guidance about the relevance and
importance of these clashing considerations” (Nelson and Kinder 1996). The more often
ideological communities are primed with these frames through repeated exposure (Nelson,
Oxley, Clawson 1997: 223), the more likely the frame‟s ability to exert effects.
Variation in degree of frame resonance is accounted for by two factors: credibility and
relative salience (Benford and Snow 2000). Two important forms of credibility are empirical
credibility and the credibility of frame articulators (Benford and Snow 2000). To be empirically
credible, the frame need not be scientifically tested; rather, the frames must be believable.
Believability is largely a function of ideology - the mixture of interests, social theories, norms
and values groups hold. Furthermore, frames resonate when statements are attributed to a
credible source; frames fail to resonate when the same statements are attributed to a non-credible
source (Druckman 2001).
Relative salience is a function of centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative
fidelity (Benford and Snow 2000). Centrality refers to “how essential the beliefs, values, and
ideas associated with movement frames are to the lives of the targets of mobilization” (621).
Experiential commensurability refers to the match between a frame and the everyday experiences
of frame receivers. Finally, narrative fidelity has to do with how a frame matches the narratives
that people tell to make sense of their lives.
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American Right-Wing Populism
“The reality of the current system is that it constitutes an unholy alliance of „corporate liberal‟
Big Business and media elites, who, through big government, have privileged and caused to rise
up a parasitic Underclass, who, among them, are looting and oppressing the bulk of the middle
and working classes in America.”
-Murray N. Rothbard, 1992

Studies of American right-wing populism (Federici 1991; Berlet and Lyons 2000)
converge on three key themes. The first shared finding of these studies is that American rightwing populism arises as a response to social, economic and political changes in the U.S. (Lipset
and Raab 1970; Federici 1991; Berlet and Lyons 2000). Second, American right-wing populists
are skeptical of elites (Canovan 1982; Federici 1991; Berlet and Lyons 2000). Third, right-wing
populism includes some sort of appeal to the “people” (Canovan 1982; Federici 1991; Berlet and
Lyons 2000). Beyond this point, their stories diverge.
Federici‟s (1991) political philosophic typology identifies American right-wing populism
as a collective “desire to change the structure of the U.S government in order to eliminate checks
on the popular will” (125). Federici (1991) anchors American right-wing populism in
plebiscitary democracy, which is held in contradistinction to constitutional democracy. The two
socio-political philosophies differ on how they conceive the fundamental capacity and tendency
of people to act in the best interest of the political community. Constitutional democracy holds
the constitution sacrosanct because of the checks it places on the peoples‟ propensity to act
undemocratically. Proponents of plebiscitary democracy contend that plebiscitary democracy
has more faith in the ability of the people to figure out what are their best interests. The sociopolitical theory of plebiscitary democracy asserts
…people are naturally good. Their passion and interests are
instinctively good. It is society and conventions that corrupt
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people…Government…should reflect the desires and interests of
the momentary numerical majority (Federici 1991: 8).
According to plebiscitary democratic socio-political theory, government subverts the good
natured free-will of the people.
As a result of these fundamental assumptions the two theories differ on their views of the
sovereign majority. Plebiscitary democracy, with faith in the free-natured good will of the people
to make correct decisions, supports the momentary numerical majority. That is, what the
majority of the people want now takes precedent over how elites constructed the constitution in
the past. Constitutional democracy, on the other hand, “considers the majority to be legitimate
when it results from an elaborate system of checks and balance, through which the will of the
majority is shaped over a period of time” (Federici 1991: 9). Skeptical of elite checks on the
popular will through constitutional democracy, populists prefer the will of the momentary
numerical majority to reign supreme.
In its purest sense, the plebiscitary democratic understanding of interests assumes that the
interests of people of various social strata are both compatible and knowable. However, the
pursuit of interests for some groups necessarily contradicts the pursuit of others‟ interests. By
allowing the momentary numerical majority to determine public policy, the interests of the
momentary numerical minority are overlooked.
The plebiscitary democratic construction of interests, furthermore, assumes that objective
interests are knowable. This assumption relies on a requisite assumption of an a priori social
order. Under modern liberalism, the pursuit of rationally maximizing self-interest is the
dominant, operating, a priori social order. Under this ideology, actors are assumed to know their
objective interests because interests can be determined deductively by ruling out that which is
impossible given the natural order of things. For example, because a welfare opponent “knows”
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that people rationally seek to maximize their self-interest, he/she therefore “knows” that given
the chance to avoid work, the welfare recipient will not work; thus providing funds to the poor
will inevitably result in dependence on taxpayer dollars rather than self-sufficiency. The result is
the reification of the self-interested welfare recipient with no desire to produce. Therefore, in
order to safeguard his/her income as well as not reward the unproductive at the expense of the
productive, the self-interested productive member of society believes he/she must oppose
welfare.
Knowledge of what has happened and knowledge of how we know what has happened
actively creates what will happen in the future. The common failure to recognize the social
construction of the past, present and future results in ideological, rather than empirical bases of
political engagement. These beliefs serve as guiding principals for interaction in the political
process, that is, in advocating interests that preserve or challenge the status quo through various
social institutions. Plebiscitary democracy is best understood as plebiscitary democratic
ideology. The social theory is that people are fundamentally good. Government subverts the
good nature of the people. The main value is freedom of the popular will. The normative
behaviors are voting for political candidates and supporting social movements in favor of
freedom of the popular will.
American right-wing populist elites tap the plebiscitary democratic ideology by framing
policy debates in terms of their effects on the good natured free will of the hard working
taxpayers. These framing strategies are enlisted in the service of right-wing policies, such as
slashing taxes, judicial reform, or bankruptcy law reform. For example, the supply-side
economic movement was framed as a means to right the wrong of a growing government
bureaucracy that lines its member‟s pockets with taxpayer dollars (Federici 1991). Furthermore,
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judicial activism – interpreting the constitution in a way that is perceived to be not what the
framers intended - is a label attached to judges who subvert the will of the people by shortcircuiting representation through elected officials (Federici 1991).
Federici‟s (1991) typology of American right-wing populism explores elites, their
ideologies and the policy debates in which they engage; however, what is sorely lacking is a
sociological examination of right-wing populists. In other words there is insufficient attention
paid to “the people” who make these movements possible and those adversely affected by tactics
used to make these movements successful. An examination of elite discourse and theoretical
debates cannot fully capture 21st century American right-wing populism. By labeling right-wing
populism as a form of resentment against the government in power, Federici (1991) glosses over
groups that are marginalized, dehumanized, demonized and scapegoated by attempts to unleash
the “good-natured popular will.”
The second major study in American right-wing populism, Berlet and Lyons‟ (2000)
Right-Wing Populism in America, connects an ideology with the processes which make rightwing populist movements successful. Berlet and Lyons‟ (2000) comparative-historical analysis
conceptualizes right-wing populism as a repressive ideology.
[Repressive populist movements] combine anti-elite scapegoating…with
efforts to maintain or intensify systems of social privilege and power.
Repressive populist movements are fueled in large part by people‟s
grievances against their own oppression but they deflect popular
discontent away from positive social change by targeting only small
sections of the elite or groups falsely identified with the elite, and
especially by channeling most anger against oppressed or marginalized
groups that offer more vulnerable targets (Berlet and Lyons 2000:5)
People in the middle – the working class and middle class - feel squeezed by elites and the
“parasitic underclass” because either their status or material conditions have declined. Right-
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wing populists resent that their hard work is squandered 2 on unproductive members of society.
The government is a key agent in this process.
In addition to plebiscitary democratic ideology, at the core of American right-wing
populism lies the work ethic ideology - the belief in the intrinsic value gained from a hard days
work; the propensity to stigmatize those who do not conform to this value system and behave
accordingly; and the theoretical assumption that the problems of individuals and the problems of
society can be fixed if we all just work harder. Producerism gives a narrative to the work ethic
ideology by “champion[ing] the so-called producers in society against both „unproductive elites‟
and subordinate groups defined as lazy or immoral” (Berlet and Lyons 2000: 6). The result of
the moralist separation between the productive and unproductive is demonization and
scapegoating of the unproductive by the productive. The productive serve their interests by
discrediting the unproductive.
Ideological beliefs function as guiding principles for interpreting social reality. This
occurs through making sense out of complex social phenomena, which results in situationally
transcendent beliefs about the “nature” of reality. The work-ethic ideology is no exception.
Situationally transcendant beliefs become a threat to democracy when they are coupled with
moralism – the tendency to see the world in terms of the struggle between good and evil (Lipset
and Raab 1970). Right-wing populists use demonization and scapegoating to weed out the good
from the bad and to assign blame to the “bad” people for all the “good” people‟s problems.
Demonization occurs when marginalized groups or individuals are excluded from the “circle of
wholesome mainstream society” (Berlet and Lyons 2000: 7) for engaging in behaviors that
transcend what is reasonable, virtuous and acceptable. With American right-right wing populism,
the demonized are the bad guys who suck the tax dollars (embodied labor of the producers) and
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crush the freedom (good natured free will of the people) of the good guys. The simplistic account
of social reality embodied in moralism, where the bad guys cause all the good guys‟ problems,
engenders scapegoating, which is the “social process whereby the hostility and grievances of an
angry, frustrated group are directed away from the real causes of a social problem onto a target
group demonized as malevolent wrongdoers” (Berlet and Lyons 2000: 8). These malevolent
wrongdoers threaten the good natured (individualistic) free will of the people by not being
productive.

End Notes
1. In The Republic, Plato lays out the ideal form of government wherein absolute power remains
in the hands of a benevolent dictator.
2. Money operates socially not only as purchasing power by convention – we agree that owning
money is owning value – but also as the symbolic embodiment of labor. Right-wing opposition
to downward distribution of wealth is more clearly understood when tax dollars are recognized
as such.
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Color Blind Racial Frames
In Racism Without Racists (2003), Eduardo Bonilla-Silva outlines four dominant frames
used to deny white racial privilege in service of preserving the racial status quo. Naturalization
is a “frame that allows whites to explain away racial phenomena by suggesting that they are
natural occurrences” (Bonilla-Silva 2003: 28). For example, a Bucktonian respondent described
segregation as a natural result of people who choose to live among those who are most like them.
Minimization is “a frame that suggests discrimination is no longer a central factor affecting
minorities‟ life chances” (Bonilla-Silva 2003: 29). Because racial discrimination does not exist to
the same degree it existed before Civil Rights, given Barack Obama‟s black presidential
administration, adherents of color-blind racial ideology do not consider discrimination a
legitimate force affecting life chances for minorities. Bonilla-Silva refers to the use of
stereotypes as cultural racism, a frame that “relies on culturally based arguments…to explain the
status of minorities in society” (Bonilla-Silva 2003: 29). For example, a Bucktonian respondent
was certain that John LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive was targeted at blacks because “black
people are always having babies and staying home and not doing shit.” Adherents of color-blind
racial ideology use the abstract liberalism frame when they use the language of political
liberalism to explain racial issues. For example, appealing to equality of opportunity is a way to
discount affirmative action programs aimed at counteracting the disproportionately small share
of minorities in high status occupations. Because the current laws on the books say that everyone
is equal, adherents of color-blind racial ideology argue, we are all equal.
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Theory
To be right-wing means to “support the state in its capacity as enforcer of order
and…oppose the state as distributor of wealth and power downward and more equitably in
society” (Diamond 1995: 9). Right-wing populists oppose downward distribution of wealth
through principled opposition to taking from the productive and giving to the unproductive
(Berlet and Lyons 2000). An ideology of individualism informs right-wing populists that their
success is solely a function of what they worked for and that social problems can be fixed if
people just work harder. They neglect the history of discrimination against minorities as they
justify the racial order through producerist frames that extol the virtues of hard work and
condemn work ethic deficiencies. By neglecting the role race plays in determining life chances,
they attribute poverty among able-bodied adults to individual rather than structural factors.
By using color-blind racial frames, right-wing populists are able to deflect demonization
by mainstream society by placing their views within the realm of reasonable and acceptable
human discourse (Bonilla-Silva 2003). By asserting that racial segregation is natural,
stereotyping minorities and minimizing the affect of discrimination through appeals to abstract
liberal principles, such as equality of opportunity, they maintain the racial order (Bonilla-Silva
2003).
Anti-welfare right-wing populists see liberal political elites and lower class minorities
engaged in a continual exchange wherein taxpayer dollars are traded for lower class minority
votes. Right-wing populists argue that this exchange oppresses hard working tax paying whites.
Right-wing populists contend that this exchange results in generational welfare-dependency,
which perpetuates social problems in the low income black community that ultimately threaten
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middle-class whites. The result has been support for sterilization incentives that appear to target
laziness yet implicitly target low-income blacks.
Although Bucktown has made socio-economic strides over the past two decades, rightwing populist ideology remains. This environment has resulted in a sterilization proposal
targeted at welfare recipients not much different than one proposed nearly twenty years earlier by
David Duke.

16

Methods
The Qualitative Research Paradigm
Although this study utilizes statistics and historical data, the overarching research
paradigm is qualitative. Creswell (2009) differentiates between quantitative and qualitative
research by pointing out the following characteristics of qualitative research: (1) qualitative
researchers study their participants in a natural setting rather than in a lab; (2) qualitative
researchers themselves are considered the main intermediary between responses and data
reporting, whereas quantitative research uses an instrument, such as a survey or questionnaire
ordinarily intervenes; (3) qualitative researchers gather multiple forms of data and pull out
themes from throughout the data; (4) qualitative research originates from a theoretical lens; (5)
qualitative data analysis generally follows an inductive path, “from the bottom up” (p. 175); (6)
qualitative research is interpretive and places emphasis on meanings constructed by participants;
(7) qualitative research has an “emergent design,” necessitating flexibility in research plans; and,
(8) qualitative research gives a holistic account (p.175-176).

The Case Study Research Design
A case study is “the intensive study of a single case for the purpose of understanding a
larger class of single units,” (Gerring 2007: 211) where a case is defined as “a spatially and
temporally delimited phenomenon observed at a single point in time or over some period in
time” (Gerring 2007: 211). In case studies, researchers employ a variety of data collection
procedures, rely on multiple sources of information and a purposeful sampling strategy
(Cresswell 1998). In addition to the nine Bucktonian interviews, the following data were
gathered: an interview with Rep. LaBruzzo, Census data on socio-economic indicators by region,
comparative election statistics for David Duke and John LaBruzzo, Department of Social
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Services statistics on TANF recipiency, Bureau of Labor Statistics data on unemployment, as
well as historical data from newspapers.
The case study method was chosen for two reasons: the criticalness of the case and the
knowledge I have of the case. Bucktown provides an exceptional place to examine right-wing
populist attitudes for several reasons. First, Bucktown is in Louisiana, which had highest voting
percentage for 2008 Republican Presidential candidate John McCain. Second, Bucktown is
located within Louisiana District 81, which elected right-wing populist David Duke, despite
mainstream Republican opposition to his candidacy. Of all voting precincts in District 81, the
three precincts that comprise Bucktown accounted for the second and fourth highest percentage
of votes. Third, Bucktown‟s current state representative recently made a right-wing populist
policy suggestion. Fourth, overt displays of racial prejudice such as a “KKK” burning have been
documented recently in Bucktown (See Figure 3).
In fact, the “KKK” burning occurred around the corner from my childhood home.
My knowledge, familiarity, and comfort in the neighborhood and with the people obviated the
need for a strategic entrée and prevented the defensiveness often associated with “data
extractors.” In other words, people in Bucktown welcomed me as a local pursuing his Master‟s
thesis, rather than as an outsider. Furthermore, my familiarity with the Bucktonian ethos granted
me greater sensitivity to the nuanced experiences, beliefs, attitudes, and ideology of its people.

The Researcher’s Role
Having prior experience with the object of study presents a challenge and opportunity in
the form of bias and depth, respectively. Thus, it is important that I present experiences that
could potentially bias my interpretations. From 1983 to 2007 I was a resident of Bucktown. I
attended a Catholic grammar school in Bucktown from 1987 to 1996 and have sustained
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relationships with other graduates. Although I no longer reside in Bucktown, most of my
immediate family, a portion of my extended family, and a few close friends still reside in
Bucktown. In addition, I am a white male from a middle-class background.

Bounding the Study
Setting
The interviews took place in the participants‟ homes, and in one case, the workplace of
these Bucktown residents. Bucktown is located in Louisiana, at the northeastern border of
Metairie, inside Jefferson Parish, along the border of New Orleans. Bucktown is a 95% white
neighborhood with a population of 3,844 (see Table 7).
Participants
Participants were purposefully selected through a snowball sampling process. Because I
grew up in the area, I began with acquaintances. I talked to a number of people to find multigenerational families who have a history in Bucktown. Participants were contacted first by
phone.
The respondents in this study included nine white Bucktonians from four families and
from three different generations as well as Louisiana State Representative John LaBruzzo.
Because the purpose of this study is to examine white, conservative attitudes towards
incentivizing sterilization of welfare recipients, the sample consisted of white conservatives.
Because I used snowball sampling, I was able to gather basic information regarding political
ideology prior to contacting respondents. Political ideologies of each respondent are not
identical but they do occupy various positions along the right wing of the political spectrum.
While some participants are more moderate conservatives, others are more extreme. Seven are
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Catholic and two are Protestant. Respondent ages range from 20s to 80s and included three
women and seven men. I describe each participant in detail below.
Carl is an eighty-something retired professional. After moving around numerous times
throughout the New Orleans Metropolitan Region, he finally settled down and bought a house in
Bucktown in the early 1950s where he became only the "third or fourth house on the whole
block.” Carl is a self-described member of the middle-class. Politically, he identifies as an
independent. He describes Bucktown as a good, hard-working, fisherman‟s village with a
mixture of people – middle-class, working class and a few well-to-do people. Carl is optimistic
about the future. He cites technological advances such as the fact that his many grandchildren
have cellular phones, the increasing knowledge held by professionals in his field, like his
grandson, and the increased aid to the poor as signs of benign progress. He does state one caveat
to progress, world war.
Carl‟s son Frank is in his fifties and is a manager in a small business. He was born and
raised and Bucktown. He has no college education, choosing instead to serve in the military. He
is a self-described member of the middle-class. Politically, he identifies as a Republican. Unlike
his father and his son, Carl is quite reserved. Carl likes the security and convenience of
Bucktown.
Franks‟s son Andrew is a graduate student in his late 20s. Like his father, he was born
and raised in Bucktown. He now rents a house near his family in Bucktown. Andrew is a selfdescribed member of the middle class. Politically, he identifies as a Republican. He recognizes
that he has had some advantages that others have not. He feels he has had everything he has ever
needed. Andrew likes that he can feel safe in Bucktown, where he “wouldn‟t in ninety percent of
other neighborhoods.”
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Minnie is in her fifties and is not yet retired from her job as a service worker. She does
not have any education past high school and has worked since she was fifteen, although she is
proud that her step-children are successful professionals. Minnie is a self-described member of
the middle class. Politically, she identifies as a Democrat. Her family‟s home was wiped out by
the 1947 Hurricane. She grew up on the water and has seen “everything” change in Bucktown to
the point where “it‟s not Bucktown anymore.” With her roots deep in Bucktown culture, Minnie
does not consider Bucktown a geographical area. Rather, to her, Bucktonians are a dying group
of people who are struggling to make it because it‟s too hard to make a living fishing out of Lake
Pontchartrain anymore. The Bucktonians she refers to are being forced to sell their houses.
She‟s frustrated that people are “tearing down all the little historical houses and building up “all
of these two story monster homes.” Minnie‟s Bucktown pride stands second to no other
interviewee when she asserts, “Bucktown has been my world. I mean, that‟s my roots. I‟m a
Bucktonian through and through.” Like Andrew, Minnie is concerned about the decline in safety
in Bucktown. She doesn‟t think it is safe anywhere anymore.
Minnie‟s sister-in-law Michelle is nearing fifty and works as a salesperson and previously
as a sales manager. She is a self-described member of the middle-class. Politically, she identifies
as a Democrat, although she often votes for Republicans. Unlike the other respondents, Michelle
married into a Bucktown family. She grew up across the 17 th St. Canal from Bucktown and fell
in love with a Bucktown boy. She enjoys fishing and shrimping in the boats her husband builds.
She‟s a little concerned about safety in Bucktown post-Katrina, but for the most part likes living
there. She is a woman of great thrift and is proud of the sacrifices she has made in her life to
provide for her family.
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Michelle‟s son Luke is a laborer in his early twenties. He has no education past high
school. Luke worked all through high school. He was recently laid off and is frustrated that he
does not have steady work. When asked what class he belongs to, he said he considers himself
about average, “but right below average just to be safe.” Luke identifies as not political. He has
plenty of relatives in Bucktown. He says “‟till this day, I‟m still meeting cousins” in Bucktown.
The only real change Luke says he has seen in Bucktown is some bigger houses being built.
Paul is in his sixties and still works a few days a week as a salesperson. Paul identifies as
a member of the middle class. Politically, he identifies as a conservative. Both Paul and his
daughter, Lucy, are Protestant. Paul‟s family moved to Bucktown from Uptown New Orleans
when he was a child, because of they couldn‟t afford a house in the city. They bought a lot in
Bucktown for $800 and built a house themselves. They raised cows, chickens and horses. He
liked that back in those days, “you could have anything you wanted as long as you didn‟t
aggravate anyone with it.” Paul moved away from Bucktown as an adult but moved back in the
1990s.
Paul‟s daughter Lucy is in her forties and works as a salesperson. She has some college
education, but does not plan to continue her education. She identifies as a member of the lower
middle class, but asserts she wants the same things as everyone else. Politically, she identifies as
an independent, although she frequently votes for Republican candidates. Although she did not
grow up in Bucktown, she was raised by a Bucktonian and moved there as an adult. Among
other reasons, she likes the convenience afforded by living in Bucktown, the accessibility to
various locations throughout the metropolitan region. Also, she has more than one family
member residing in Bucktown.
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Don is in his seventies. Don was born and raised in Bucktown. His upbringing was a life
of hard work – working days as a laborer and at night in the seafood industry in Bucktown.
Although he has less than a middle-school education, he has a successful small business. His
children and grandchildren received college educations and are in professional and technical
occupations. Don identifies as middle-class. He identifies as non-political and admits to not
paying much attention to politics, although he is concerned about the rise in drug use among
young people today and related crimes.
Ethical Considerations
Informed consent was obtained from each respondent through adherence to Institutional
Review Board standards. An application for conducting research on human subjects was filed
with the University of New Orleans Institutional Review Board. Every respondent signed an
approved consent form. Furthermore, harm to respondents was prevented by keeping their
identities confidential. Respondent‟s names were changed to conceal their identities. In addition,
personal and organizational names mentioned were altered. No information that respondents did
not want published is included in this thesis. For example, when a respondent made a comment
and then said not to include it in the thesis, I made notes and excluded it from the presentation of
findings.
Data Collection
Interview data were collected between November 2008 and March 2009. Each
participant was interviewed once during this period. The interviews varied from twenty minutes
to two hours. Data were electronically recorded and later transcribed. Some handwritten were
taken during the interviews which were placed in the same files as their corresponding
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interviews. All interviews were face-to-face and one-on-one. The interview locations were
chosen by the interviewees, with the only condition that the interview location provided privacy.
Among the benefits of qualitative interviews are the researcher‟s control of the line of
questioning and the opportunity to gather historical and demographic information from the
participants (Creswell 2009: 179). Although I had a set of questions to probe the respondents‟
beliefs and attitudes (see Appendix A), several times my questions were answered without
asking the questions specifically. For example, asking what respondents thought about Rep.
LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive often elicited responses about what they thought about welfare
and poverty in general.
Data Analysis Procedures
This study is driven by two theoretical propositions. The primary proposition is that
support for repressive policies is rooted in right-wing populist ideology, particularly the
producerist framework which pits the productive members of society against the unproductive
members of society. The secondary proposition is the idea that socioeconomic change will affect
ideological change. The primary proposition is analyzed with interviews. The secondary
proposition is analyzed with statistical Census data from 1990 and 2000. The analysis of both
propositions is supported by the development of the case description through historical data
Interview data were analyzed through pattern-matching, comparing “an empirically based
pattern with a predicted one” (Trochim 1989, cited in Yin 1994). Analysis followed an iterative,
explanation building process, ultimately developing ideas for future study rather than drawing
grand conclusions (Yin 1994: 110). Primarily, the predicted proposition that a producerist
framework explains support for repressive policies was compared with interview data.
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To this end, interview data were coded and organized thematically into general
categories. The coding procedure used was categorical aggregation - using a collection of
instances from the data to find issue-relevant meanings (Stake 1995, cited in Cresswell 1998).
Twenty-three preliminary themes emerged from responses with multiple instances found.
Themes deemed not central to the study‟s propositions were excluded from further analysis. The
remaining themes were re-conceptualized as sub-themes underneath larger, more comprehensive
themes. The higher level themes included the following: producerism, racial ideology, and
welfare knowledge.

Verification
Reliability in qualitative studies refers to making sure “the researcher‟s approach is
consistent across different researchers and different projects” (Gibbs 2007, cited in Creswell
2009: 190). Two strategies were employed to increase reliability. First, transcripts were doublechecked to make sure that obvious mistakes were not made during transcription. Second, drifts in
the definition of codes were guarded against by taking notes about the codes and returning to
these notes throughout the coding process.
The following strategies were used to ensure validity: triangulation of data sources, bias
clarification and peer debriefing. Triangulation refers to using multiple data sources.
Triangulation adds to validity when multiple sources are used to establish themes (Creswell
2009). Themes from the interviews were not entirely emergent. Most themes linked up with
existing historical data. For example, historical data suggests a reverse discrimination frame is
salient in District 81 politics. Participant responses converged with this theme. Creswell (2009)
asserts that “good qualitative research contains comments by the researchers about how their
interpretations are shaped by their background” (Creswell 2009:192). To this end, I state my
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background above. Furthermore, Creswell (2009) states that peer debriefing involves “locating a
person (a peer debriefer) who reviews and asks questions about the qualitative study so that the
account will resonate with people other than the researcher” (192). Because this study was in
partial fulfillment of a Master‟s Degree, progress was constantly monitored by my thesis
committee.
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Context: Bucktown
Bucktonians dispute the exact size of their neighborhood. The neighborhood of
Bucktown, which is located in the Northeast corner of Metairie, Jefferson Parish‟s most
populous area1, abuts the Northwest border of New Orleans (see Figures 1, 2). “In its most
exclusive parameters, [Bucktown] is but a narrow roadway located on a strip of land about one
and a half blocks long, and forty five feet wide” (Accardo 1989). “True” Bucktonians, those
who trace their lineage to fishermen who lived within these exclusive parameters, will remind
you of what Bucktown once was: a small fishing community bordered by the 17th St. Canal and
Lake Pontchartrain. Colloquial boundaries refer to developments outside of the original village
as “Buck Vista,” a play on combining the names of the neighboring Lake Vista with Bucktown.
Bucktown has grown from a one and a half square-block area to a 3 by 19 block area. Those who
identify as Bucktonians are not simply confined to the small strip of land where the fishing boats
once docked. Eager to self-identify with Bucktown, those who reside between West Esplanade
and Lake Pontchartrain longitudinally and Bonnabel Boulevard and the 17 th Street Canal
lattitudinally do not refer to themselves as simply Metairian. Like most people from historic
urban neighborhoods, they present themselves as members of a specific neighborhood with
distinct cultural imagery. They present themselves as Bucktonians. In fact, those who reside
south and west of Bucktown (the wider definition), in the areas where the houses have been
historically larger, often consider their neighborhood part of “Uptown Bucktown.” There is a
sense of pride in self-identification with Bucktown. For this study, Bucktown will refer to the
larger parameters – the 3x19 square block area between Lake Pontchartrain and W. Esplanade,
north to south, and Bonnabel Blvd. and the 17th St. Canal, west to east.
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Regardless of what area one considers Bucktown and what area one considers “just
Metairie,” no one disputes that Bucktown is not what it used to be. Over the past 150 years,
Bucktown has grown from a community of 25 “squatting” families” (Accardo 1989: 20) to
neighborhood of 3,444 people, with 1,800 households (see Table 1). The wilderness that once
lay between the Bucktown Peninsula (East End) and the flat land at Bonnabel Blvd. (the new
western edge of Bucktown) and Lake Pontchartrain has been developed into a mostly middle
class neighborhood. Bucktown now has two schools, several seafood restaurants, a couple bars,
both Catholic and Lutheran churches, several modest apartment complexes, a multi-story office
building, two posh condominiums, a Coast Guard station and, since Hurricane Katrina, a massive
pumping station.

The Evolution of Bucktown
In the mid 19th century, the people of Bucktown “made their living from fishing,
crabbing, hunting, and trapping and also from the rental of rooms and boats and the sale of
fishing tackle and bait to vacationers” (Swanson 1975:133). During the latter half of the 19 th
Century, the East End of Metairie and the West End of New Orleans were better known
collectively as Lakeport, a place where you could find fishing camps, hotels, restaurant, and
other amusement places (Swanson 1975).
During the week, Bucktown was a sleepy fishing village, providing
local merchants with shrimp, hard- and soft-shell crabs, speckled
trout, croakers, flounders, and other seafood delights…But on the
weekends, that all changed. The influx of city folk turned
Bucktown into a boom town. On a typical weekend the Bucktown
Five Band could be heard playing at any one of a number of
fishing camps… Such tunes as “Bucktown Bounce” by Johnny
Wiggs and “Bucktown Blues” by Jelly Roll Morton recall the
strains of early New Orleans jazz that blared from the camps and
pavilions while revelers danced the famed „two-step‟ until
exhaustion overwhelmed them (Accardo 1989: 25)
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During the late 19th century and early 20th century, “Bucktown considered itself an autonomous
political unit outside the governmental jurisdiction of both Jefferson Parish … and the city of
New Orleans” (Accardo 1989: 39). Consequently its “mayor,” Captain John Bruining, built a
two-cell jail to keep visitors in line and also started the Bucktown Volunteer Fire Department
(Accardo 1989: 40). Bucktown‟s hey day as an entertainment hot spot outside the jurisdiction of
Orleans Parish did not last forever.
After the repeal of prohibition, bootlegging was no longer a viable
source of additional income. Gambling flourished in the bars and
restaurants well past World War I, but the resorts and the lakeshore
amusements failed to survive World War II, the Great Depression,
and the early twentieth century residential and commercial
development of the lakefront” Accardo 1989: 40-41)
It was the beginning of the end for what was once Bucktown.
After World War II, in order to meet the housing demand from New Orleans‟
overflowing population, real estate developers dredged in sand to fill in the swamps and marshes
that was once the land south and west of the Bucktown peninsula (Accardo 1989: 50). After the
1947 Hurricane wreaked havoc on Bucktown and surrounding Orleans and Jefferson Parish, sand
was dredged to construct a levee along Lake Pontchartrain, providing the appearance of safety
from flooding. Additionally, in response to the burgeoning civil rights movement and Brown vs.
the Board of education (1954), white flight led to the outpouring of New Orleanians into
Jefferson Parish. Middle and working-class white families moved away from the cities and into
the suburbs. When they moved to Bucktown, the larger market created increased demand for
seafood, thus providing an economic stimulus for the fishermen.
Although the economic stimulation brought modern amenities such as sidewalks,
subsequent developments emanating from the increased demand for nearby land left Bucktown
with only seven of its original homes and resulted in fisherman paying slip fees to dock their
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boats along the 17th Street Canal (Accardo 1989). Then, in the early 1990‟s, the Bucktown
community was threatened by a proposal to construct a marina. The Bucktown Civic
Association was formed to oppose the marina‟s construction. They were successful, however,
less than a decade later a Coast Guard station was built at the proposed sight of the marina. After
Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, disputing slip fees has become a moot point, because the point of
intersection between the 17th St. Canal and Lake Pontchartrain, where Bucktown was founded
and where the fishermen docked their boats, is now home to New Orleans‟ newest pumping
station. Some view this as the last nail in Bucktown‟s coffin, since the local fishermen can no
longer dock their boats along the 17th St. canal. Moreover, the pumping station - the ugliest piece
of necessary infrastructure - blocks the entry to Lake Pontchartrian.
Some descendants of the old “squatter” families still remain in Bucktown, although they
are not as geographically condensed. They now often live among post-World War II
Bucktonians. Over the past two decades, a new trend has emerged in Bucktown: the post World
War II houses are being marketed as tear-downs, often yielding prime land for middle-class
families to build their multi-story dream houses.
There are three waves of Bucktown families. The first 2 have resided in Bucktown for
several generations. These are the families that will not let you forget the old Bucktown
parameters north of Hammond Highway. They are descendants of fishermen and those who took
advantage of the business from “city dwellers flocking to the lakeshore” during the Lakeport
days when Bucktown was a local vacation destination (Accardo 1989: 66). Their families pass
down knowledge of when all the land between Old Bucktown and the Bonnabel Boat Launch
was nothing but wilderness. The Bucktonians who have been there for three or more generations
give the community its fisherman charm. The second wave has been there for two or three
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generations. They came after World War II when contractors could not build prefabricated
houses with slab foundations fast enough to meet demand. Their arrival in Bucktown coincided
with white flight from New Orleans. These families often came from Uptown New Orleans to
become part of the mixed middle- and working-class neighborhood of Bucktown. The third
wave3 of Bucktonians emerged over the past two decades, coinciding with the real estate boom
of the late 1990s and early 2000s. They bought tear-down houses and constructed two-story and,
in a few cases, three-story houses worthy of their middle- and upper-middle class salaries.

Socioeconomic Status in Transition
Bucktown maintained a blue-collar, working-class appearance until the 1990s. Over the
past two decades the influx of third wave Bucktonians has changed the landscape and the
socioeconomic status of the neighborhood. While the second wave influx in the 1950s and 1960s
brought sidewalks to Bucktown, the third wave has been accompanied by two new high rise
buildings. From the early 1990s to 2009, Bucktown has transitioned from a place where “there
[were] more pickup trucks than average” (Wildgen 1995) to a community that is approaching the
appearance of more affluent areas in District 81. Census data from 1990 and 2000 on income,
education and occupation offer a glimpse into the socioeconomic transition underway in
Bucktown. Ultimately these statistics suggest that Bucktown is now a mostly middle-class
neighborhood.
Income
Bucktown‟s mean household income is roughly $8,000 less per year than the U.S.
average; however, this may be largely due to the disparity between the standard of living in
Southern states and other, more affluent regions of the country. Nonetheless, Bucktown‟s mean
household income has grown at over one and one half times the rate of the United States‟ mean
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household income (see Table 1, 2). From 1989 to 1999, Bucktown‟s mean household income
increased 17% to $65,560 (in 2008 dollars), while the U.S. mean household income rose 10% to
$73,609. Additionally, Bucktown‟s rate of mean household income growth surpasses that of
Louisiana (13%) and Jefferson Parish (11%).
Education
Perhaps the most notable area in which Bucktown is outpacing the United States as a
whole is in education (see Table 3, 4). The percent of Bucktonians with graduate degrees (11%)
has increased by 42% since 1990, which is nearly twice as much than that of the U.S. (9%).
Nineteen percent of Bucktonians hold bachelors degrees, whereas only 13% of the U.S. holds a
bachelors degree. Moreover, the 25% decline in the percentage of Bucktonians having only a
high school diploma is five times higher than that of the United States (5%). Furthermore, over
61% of Bucktonians have at least some post-secondary education, whereas only 52% of
Americans have attended school beyond the 12th grade. Thus, the number of high status degrees
in Bucktown is rising, while lower status degrees are declining.
Occupation
The meaning of changes in occupation of residents in Bucktown and the United States is
not as obvious as the changes in education (see Table 5, 6). Bucktonians have a much smaller
percentage of service sector and blue-collar jobs –operator and crafts – (30%), than the U.S.,
(39%). Likewise, Bucktown has a higher percentage of white collar jobs, 70%, than the U.S.,
61%. However, the percent increase in white collar jobs and percent decrease in blue-collar jobs
from 1990 to 2000 was greater for Americans in general than among Bucktonians, while the
percent increase in service sector jobs was greater for Bucktonians. To interpret trends in
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occupational composition, it is necessary to look into varying trends within these white-collar,
blue-collar, and service sector categories.
In Bucktown, the proportion of white collar jobs with high autonomy grew relative to the
proportion of low autonomy white collar jobs, while the proportion of low skill blue-collar jobs
grew relative to the proportion of high skill blue-collar jobs. The percentage of high autonomy
white collar jobs – managerial and professional - increased more from 1990-2000 in Bucktown,
6% and 60% respectively, than in the U.S., 9% and 43% respectively; the percentage of less
autonomous white collar jobs in technical, sales and administrative support decreased twice as
much in Bucktown (32%) than in the U.S. as a whole (16%). Service occupations increased four
times as much in Bucktown (58%) than in the U.S (12.4%). Higher skilled blue-collar jobs –
precision production, craft and repair - decreased 42%, compared to 17% in the U.S.; operators
and laborers increased substantially in Bucktown, 62%, while they declined by 1% in the U.S.
Although the average Bucktonian job status is higher than the U.S. average, job
autonomy among Bucktown residents is becoming more stratified than in the U.S. This analysis
highlights the problems entailed in labeling an entire neighborhood as middle or working-class.
It also demonstrates the widening class gap in Bucktown that began with 2nd wave of
Bucktonians moving into three bedroom, one story houses and continued in recent years as 3rd
wave Bucktonians purchase these “tear down” houses and develop two (and some times three-)
story houses. Bucktown is a mixed-class neighborhood with white working- and middle-class
families living side-by-side; however, if we were forced to box the neighborhood today into a
socioeconomic category, the snuggest fit for the once blue-collar fishing village is middle-class.
The high educational attainment, sharply rising mean income and the relatively high proportion
of high autonomy white-collar workers does not warrant a working-class stamp. The economic
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reality of Bucktown is that the average person inhabiting the neighborhood in 2000 has
statistically better life chances than the average Bucktonians residing there in 1990. Bucktown
has become an upwardly mobile community. Given the socioeconomic transition underway in
Bucktown, one might assume the political culture to be changing as well.

Political Culture in Bucktown
In this next section I attempt to outline the political culture of Bucktown by highlighting
significant recent events in Bucktown history. First, I situate Bucktown within its Louisiana
legislative district. Then, I briefly recap the infamous 1989 election of David Duke, former
Grand Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Finally I draw comparisons between David
Duke‟s welfare mitigation strategies and the welfare mitigation strategies of current 81st
District‟s state representative, John LaBruzzo‟s.
District 81
The District known for sending David Duke to the halls of Louisiana state political power
in Baton Rouge received considerable attention from scholars (Powell 1992; Widgen 1995) in
the early 1990‟s. Those interested in District 81 as a piece of the Duke phenomenon have
constructed a socio-economic spectrum confluent with geographical location to describe those
residing in the 81st District. On the northern end, by Lake Pontchartrain, there is the blue collar,
working class fishing village of Bucktown. On the southern end, approaching the Mississippi
River, there is the more affluent neighborhood of Old Metairie. And, “in between sprawls a
crazy-quilt pattern of apartment complexes for young singles, clapboard bungalows owned by
skilled craft workers, and the Levittownish Creole cottages (in brick, not cypress) of salesmen,
technicians, and lower-level administrators” (Powell 1992). It seems this characterization of
District 81 holds true today, with two exceptions. The first of which has been discussed above -
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the socioeconomic transition in Bucktown. It appears that a similar transition is underway in the
area between Old-Metairie and Bucktown. The second exception is that in 2003 the District 81
boundaries were redrawn and expanded to include areas west of Bucktown. From 1981 to 2003,
District 81 added roughly three census tracts. It appears the demographics of this area closely
approach the demographics of the rest of District 81. In the annexed section of District 81, you
will find some of the largest houses in District 81, several apartment complexes and a business
corridor.
Duke Country
In 1989, District 81, gained national notoriety when they elected former Grand Wizard of
the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, David Duke as state representative. Bucktown was long
removed from considering itself an autonomous political unit; however, its vote in the 1989
legislative election displayed residents‟ disregard for mainstream perceptions about equal rights
and establishment politicians and in the process “determined the outcome of the most
extraordinary legislative race in Louisiana history” (O‟Byrne 1989: A-14).
Perhaps, more extraordinary than the former Nazi sympathizer‟s presence in the runoff is
the widespread backlash Duke‟s candidacy provoked. His candidacy drew attention from more
than his opponent, home-builder John Treen, whose brother was previously governor of
Louisiana. Among his adversaries were “the Catholic Church, local and national Jewish activists,
the governor, virtually the entire political establishment of New Orleans and Jefferson Parish, the
money and expertise of the Republican National Committee and, ultimately, former President
Reagan and [former] President [George H.W.] Bush” (O‟Byrne 1989: A-14). Archbishop Phillip
Hannan of New Orleans “risked papal censure by issuing a statement against Duke‟s candidacy”
(Morgan 1991: 2). Also, Rev. James C. Carter, president of Loyola University of New Orleans
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made a public statement against Duke. Rabbi Mordechai Levy, head of the Jewish Defense
Organization, attempted to march through District 81 to oppose Duke, but was unable to obtain a
permit. Perhaps even more extraordinary is the effect that the gross condemnation of the
charismatic leader of the National Association for the Advancement of White People had on Mr.
Treen‟s campaign. According to the Times Picayune‟s (1989) account, meddling by the “big
boys” – President Bush‟s letter endorsing Treen and Ronald Reagan‟s radio endorsement of his
“friend” John Treen - galvanized Duke‟s supporters.
Duke‟s victory defied conventional logic. Nazi sympathizers were not supposed to win
elections, at least not in metropolitan areas in the late 20th century. This sort of reasoning is what
made the smack of reality come as such a surprise to Duke‟s opponents when he won the 1989
election by 226 votes. While Duke‟s ties to the KKK and the photographs of David Duke in a
Nazi uniform during his years of “youthful indiscretion” were enough to derail his runoff in the
1992 gubernatorial election against left-wing populist Edwin Edwards in 1992; however, Duke‟s
polished message in 1989 could not be defeated by his past.
The major New Orleans daily newspaper, the Times Picayune, hired Multi-Quest
International, a Metairie based market research firm, to figure out why people supported Duke
during the “most extraordinary legislative race in Louisiana history” (O‟Byrne 1989: A-14). The
twenty interviews found that “almost universally, those who voted for Duke said they did so in
spite of his past rather than because of it” (Rhoden 1989: A-15). What drew these Metairians to
Duke was that they “wanted an elected official to stand up for what they see as the average, hardworking white American” (Rhoden 1989: A-15). In addition to Duke‟s charisma, aggressiveness
and independence, people in District 81 believed firmly in Duke‟s “equal rights” stance, which
condemned “affirmative action programs, minority set asides, racial quotas and other efforts on
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behalf of blacks [that] have tilted the system against [whites]” (Rhoden 1989: A-15). When
Duke moved to the state capital in Baton Rouge Baton Rouge, he attempted to do what he
campaigned to do – level the playing field for whites.
Duke‟s tenure as representative of District 81 was not a productive one. Racial issues
were the target of almost all of Duke‟s bills. The racially charged part of his legislative package
included: (1) abolishing affirmative action programs; (2) increasing penalties for possession and
sale of drugs in public housing projects; (3) cutting off welfare benefits to convicted drug
offenders; and, (4) providing financial incentives for public assistance recipients to use
contraceptives (Wildgen 1995). Duke was unsuccessful in passing this legislation. His only bill
to become law during his three years in office was House Bill 1623, which prohibited jurors
from profiting from their jury service (Wildgen 1995). Although Duke was unsuccessful in
pushing his agenda, he did represent his constituents, or at least the simple majority of District 81
residents that voted for him (that is, assuming the 1989 Multi-quest International study
accurately grasped the sentiments of District 81). Duke‟s legislative package attempted to
counteract “efforts on behalf of blacks [that] have tilted the system against [whites]” (Rhoden
1989: A-15). One of his efforts to do so was more creative than others.
House Bill 1584
One of the most striking items on Duke‟s legislative agenda was a proposal framed to
reduce welfare costs and the cycle of poverty. House Bill No. 1584 proposed providing cash
payments for welfare recipients who consented to long-term surgically implanted contraceptives.
Duke‟s original plan was to give recipients of Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC), which was
transformed into Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) in the 1990s, $100 a year for as
long as they retained Norplant implants, which effectively sterilizes patients for five years or

37

until surgically removed (Hill and Wise 1991). Duke claimed that the goal of the bill was to
reduce welfare costs and to break the cycle of poverty. A report on House Bill No. 1584,
prepared by Lance Hill and Tim Wise (1991) of the Louisiana Coalition Against Racism and
Nazism (LCARN), an organization formed to oppose David Duke, argues that the proposal was
“a thinly veiled sterilization plan designed to reduce the black population” (p. 1). Hill and Wise
(1991), armed with many of Duke‟s own words, insist that House Bill No. 1584 has the same
intentions and implications of Nazi eugenics. In 1986, two years before David Duke started his
campaign for electoral office, he wrote the following in a letter to U.S. News and World Reports:
No one could ever deny that environment has a great impact. It
does. Yet, its time to face up to the fact that heredity is at least
equally important. Once that is admitted, it affords magnificent
possibilities for mankind…There is no reason we shouldn‟t give
incentives to welfare recipients, criminals, and mentally defective
to go childless. On the other hand, there is no good reason why we
shouldn‟t offer the gifted and successful incentives to have more
children (Duke 1986: 3, cited in Hill and Wise 1991)
Hill and Wise (1991) present more of Duke‟s words to reveal his preference for white
genes:
There are plenty of ways to intelligently slow down the non-white
birth rate…It is the idea that the racial make-up of America is vital
to her well-being, that our genetic and cultural heritage must be
preserved, and that the best elements in our people must be
promoted and cultivated so our people can realize their promise in
the stars (Duke 1983, cited in Hill and Wise 1991).
According to Hill and Wise (1991), House Bill No.1584 evolved from earlier racist, hereditaryselective suggestions, such as the ones discussed above. Eugenics is promoting valued genetic
qualities and demoting less valued genetic qualities by selective breeding. David Duke made a
qualitative judgment in population policy that favors one group of people over another.
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When the bill came to the House committee, Duke moved to amend the bill to allow
welfare recipients to use the $100 for any form of birth control, including abstinence (Anderson
and Frazier: 1991). Rather than the thirteen member committee settling on Duke‟s watered
down sterilization bill, they stiffened the proposal, increasing the $100 annual payment to $100
monthly, effectively gutting the bill. House Bill No. 1584 did not pass the House.
One year after his election, David Duke ran an unsuccessful campaign for state senator.
In 1992 he lost the governor‟s race4 to the left-wing populist and three time Louisiana governor
(1971, 1975, 1983), Edwin Edwards, who had spent most of his third term in office under federal
indictment for racketeering and is currently in jail for misdeeds during his fourth term. Although
Duke lost the 1992 Louisiana gubernatorial election, he did get 55% of the white vote in
Louisiana.
Duke left his seat in the state legislature because he could not run for his legislative seat
and governor concurrently. In 1992 Duke was replaced by Rhodes Scholar David Vitter. Vitter
did not draw his support from Duke‟s precincts (Wildgen 1995). In 1999 Vitter left District 81
for a seat in the U.S. Senate and was replaced by Jennifer Sneed, who left the office after being
elected to the Jefferson Parish Council. In 2004 Sneed was replaced by John LaBruzzo, a local
medical sales representative who ran on a platform of bringing business to Louisiana and
instituting tuition tax credits. In 2008 John LaBruzzo, who resides in Bucktown, ran unopposed
and remains District 81‟s representative. Since David Duke left office, the country lost interest
in who was representing District 81. That was until John LaBruzzo stepped into the national
media spotlight for making a proposal similar to Duke‟s House Bill No. 1584.
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LaBruzzo’s Proposal
In September 2008, John LaBruzzo publicly announced on a talk radio show that he was
looking into providing low-income men and women with a $1,000 incentive to undergo tubal
ligations and vasectomies. Further, he stated that he was looking into creating tax incentives that
would foster increased fertility among college-educated, affluent couples. According to Rep.
LaBruzzo,
we‟re on a train headed to the future and there‟s a bridge out…and
nobody wants to talk about it…what I‟m really studying is any and
all possibilities that we can reduce the number of people that are
going from generational welfare to generational welfare (Waller
2008).
Rep. LaBruzzo‟s proposal was not well received and resulted in formal and informal sanctions
just days after his announcement. Archbishop Alfred C. Hughes of New Orleans publicly
condemned his idea for being “an egregious affront to those targeted and blatantly anti-life”
(Times Picayune 2008) Rep. LaBruzzo also drew criticism from Republican Governor Bobby
Jindal, as well as from the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus and the Louisiana Democratic
Caucus. Rep. Juan LaFonta, D-New Orleans, former Black Caucus chairman said, “LaBruzzo‟s
an idiot…I think it‟s totally disrespectful to poor people in this country” (Moller 2008). Less
than two weeks after his sterilization announcement, Rep. LaBruzzo lost his seat as Vice
Chairman on the Louisiana House Health and Welfare Committee.
John LaBruzzo found himself in the national spotlight as he promulgated his proposal to
sterilize welfare recipients. Back in Louisiana, speculation abounded as to why Rep. LaBruzzo
made the suggestion. Many called him a racist and a eugenicist. Others, including his former
fellow Jefferson Parish representative, Danny Martiny R-Kenner, think he is “well-intentioned,
but there are times he doesn‟t give a lot of forethought to coming out with some of the
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controversial things he says” (Moller 2008). Yet others perceive LaBruzzo‟s sterilization
proposal as a political maneuver, a way to pander to his constituents in an effort to make them
forget about his support for doubling legislator‟s salaries, which became political folly just
months earlier. Like many of the pay raise bill‟s supporters, LaBruzzo was staring down the
barrel of a recall petition. Whether his proposal was an attempt at redemption, well thought out
and sincere, or whether his proposal exemplified LaBruzzo‟s off the cuff modus operandi, the
fact that LaBruzzo could feel confident in offering $1,000 to welfare recipients to get their tubes
tied sparks curiosity about his constituency.
Speculation aside, the nation was reminded of just what District John LaBruzzo
represents. The national and local media was eager to liken LaBruzzo to his notorious
predecessor, David Duke – an association that does not sit well with Rep. LaBruzzo. I asked
representative LaBruzzo what he thought about the association made by James Gill, a columnist
for the local newspaper, the Times Picayune. He said
He wants to associate me with somebody who once held my seat
when I was in high school, who belonged to some secret
organization that wouldn‟t even let Italians in, that would be
opposed to me and my background and my heritage…I don‟t
appreciate anyone who thinks poorly on Italians, so I wouldn‟t
think much of them or James Gill. David Duke was against taxes,
higher taxes. Does that mean everyone who is against higher taxes
is like David Duke?
Although they both presented bills to incentivize sterilization among the poor in order to reduce
generational welfare, they do not share the same history or voting base in District 81. Indeed,
John LaBruzzo is no David Duke. John LaBruzzo has the untarnished image David Duke needed
when he ran for governor in 1992. Although LaBruzzo, like David Duke, has been criticized for
drawing unnecessary attention to himself in the legislature, he did not spend time on the soap
box in Louisiana State University‟s free speech alley in a Nazi uniform sympathizing with the
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Nazi cause and starting nativist student organizations. John LaBruzzo did not head one of the
largest and oldest hate groups in the United States (Knights of the Ku Klux Klan). John
LaBruzzo did not start his own segregationist newsletter (National Association for the
Advancement of White People). John LaBruzzo does not sell “Mein Kampf” out of his
legislative office in Metairie (Rickey 1992).
The difference between LaBruzzo and Duke‟s appeal shows in the disparity between their
voting bases. First, LaBruzzo won his election against trial lawyer Mickey Landry more
decisively than Duke beat homebuilder John Treen, capturing 55% of the 81st District votes
compared to Duke‟s narrow margin of 226 votes (51%-49%) (Louisiana Secretary of State
2008). The distinction between LaBruzzo and Duke‟s support is most marked in the shady tree
lined-streets in Old Metairie. In these more affluent precincts near Metairie‟s only golf course,
Duke drew 21% and 34% of the vote, whereas LaBruzzo received 65% and 51% respectively
(Louisiana Secretary of State 2008). The three precincts where Duke received his 2nd (65%) and
4th (63%) highest percentage of votes are the three precincts that comprise Bucktown5
(Louisiana Secretary of State 2008). One would think that the three precincts that voted in the
Klansman would reject LaBruzzo, the more affluent medical sales representative; however,
voting patterns indicate that candidate biography and profession do not separate LaBruzzo and
Duke Supporters. LaBruzzo collected 64%, 59% and 53% of the vote from the once
overwhelmingly blue-collar Bucktown precincts (Louisiana Secretary of State 2008). Although
the socioeconomic makeup has changed in Bucktown, the political culture seems to have
remained the same.
Bucktown remains a critical case of right-wing populist ideology, as evidenced by the
reappearance of a sterilization incentive to target the supposed unproductive underclass.
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End Notes
1 Metairie is unincorporated as opposed to the incorporated Jefferson Parish city of Kenner
2 The first wave I refer to is considered two separate waves by Accardo (1989): the first wave
referring to the original 25 squatter families and the second referring to those who moved to the
area during Bucktown‟s “boom” days, when “city dwellers flock[ed] to the lake shore (Accardo
1989: 66).
3 Accardo (1989) does not consider this new wave, because this trend was just emerging as she
was writing.
4 Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, Harry Lee, dubbed Duke‟s 1989 race with David Treen a
competition between a “bigot and an asshole” (O‟Byrne 1989). The governor‟s race between
Duke and four-time governor Edwin Edwards in 1992, was well known as the race between the
“crook and the klansman.” Bumper stickers throughout the state reading, “Vote for the Crook.
It‟s important” could be seen throughout the state.
5 One of these precincts actually includes 9 blocks (roughly one third of the precinct
geographically) outside of Bucktown.
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Findings
Right-wing populists oppose downward distribution of wealth through principled
opposition to taking from the productive and giving to the unproductive (Berlet and Lyons
2000). Despite attributing their financial situation to individual hard work and sacrifice (Feldman
1982), they attribute poverty to both individual and structural factors. They find three structural
causes - defects in minority sub-cultures, the incentive for welfare-dependency, and the culture
of poverty that welfare-dependency creates. In addition, right-wing populists either minimize the
affect race plays in determining life chances or assert that whites have worse life chances than
blacks because of minority set-asides. Unlike left-wing populists, they view government as the
cause, not the solution to their oppression. They scapegoat the exchange of taxpayers‟ dollars
between liberal political elites and welfare recipients as the cause of their oppression. For the
respondents, the most salient scapegoat of this oppression is low-income black welfare
recipients. In addition to this social theory, right-wing populists have an ideological, rather than
empirical understanding of the current state of the welfare system in America.
Despite socio-economic strides and changes in political representation, right-wing
ideology remains in Bucktown. Support for Rep. LaBruzzo‟s voluntary sterilization policy
suggestion exists in Bucktown.
This section presents findings from ten interviews with Bucktonians. First, individualistic
attitudes that blame government as the cause rather than the solution to the taxpayers‟ problems
are presented. Second, respondents‟ beliefs are presented about equality of opportunity and the
disparity in life chances between whites and blacks. Third, frames used by the respondents to
explain poverty and welfare – work ethic, generational welfare-dependency and deservingness –
are discussed. Fourth, racial frames used by the respondents are presented – reverse
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discrimination, white supremacy, cultural racism, political correctness. Fifth, support and
opposition for John LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive are discussed. Sixth, respondents‟
ideological understanding of welfare programs and welfare recipients are presented. And finally,
respondents‟ attitudes towards elites are examined.

45

Individualism
“If you read the constitution, you don‟t see anywhere in there that we have an obligation to take
care of other people who aren‟t able to take care of themselves.”
-Rep. John LaBruzzo

Party identification proved an unreliable predictor of attitudes towards LaBruzzo‟s
proposal. Of the nine Bucktonians interviewed, three were Republicans, two were Democrats,
two were independent (although one identified as conservative), and two considered themselves
“not political.” Although all seven respondents who voted chose John McCain over Barrack
Obama in the 2009 presidential election, they all generally held a right-wing ideology, that is, for
the most part, they “oppose the state as distributor of wealth and power downward and more
equitably in society” (Diamond 1995: 9). For example, Andrew said, “I just don‟t believe in a
communistic type society where you take from the rich and give to the poor.”
Part of the reason that respondents oppose tax raises is their mistrust of government. For
example, Luke, a laborer in his twenties, said, “the way you really have to look at it is the
government is always fucking you. So the way I look at it is get whatever you can.”
Luke asserts that people maximize their material interests in the face of an untrustworthy
government. His belief in people rationally pursuing their self-interest appeared in his concern
about a sterilization incentive. He expressed concern that women recipients might get pregnant
first and then get their tubes tied in order to receive “more tax money” while still bearing a child.
The Bucktonian respondents expressed that hard work and sacrifice on the part of
individuals, not a bloated government, will solve social problems. As Lucy, a middle-aged
salesperson, said
I think everybody should take care of themselves. I don‟t have kids
because I can‟t afford to take care of kids. That‟s how I feel about
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it. I think everybody that‟s able to work - and not because they
have a drug problem or because they got an alcohol problem or
some kind of dependency problem; if you have kids, you should
take care of them
Lucy is unsympathetic to the plight of those that require government assistance. She‟s concerned
with the “socialistic government” that she thinks liberals are looking for. In this regard, John
LaBruzzo seems ideologically the ideal politician to represent her. Rep. LaBruzzo states,
I am a conservative, probably one of the more conservative
Republicans in the state. And I don‟t apologize for that. I know
you draw a lot of attention, negative or positive, for being a true
conservative these days, but look where our country is. We‟re
going socialist. We‟re going to the left under Barack Obama! I
think we need people who are willing to stand up and be
courageous and say “hey look. Enough is enough. This isn‟t what
are country is founded upon.” If you read the constitution, you
don‟t see anywhere in there that we have an obligation to take care
of other people who aren‟t able to take care of themselves. But we
do. And since we do, it‟s only fair that we spend the tax-payers‟
dollars wisely. You have to remember that this isn‟t my money.
This isn‟t the state‟s money. This is the p…, the tax-payers‟ dollar.
So, I think we have a responsibility, a fiduciary responsibility to
spend it wisely and make sure we‟re not giving it to people who
are using it to buy drugs.
Rep. LaBruzzo frames individualism as an American legacy that has survived through adhering
to the constitution. He praises the hero who battles the irresponsible left that doesn‟t know when
to stop giving in to people who can‟t “take care of themselves.” That hero must be a person of
the people, the taxpayers. Indeed, modern right-wing populist rhetoric has replaced “the people”
with the “taxpayers.” He/she must guard the taxpayers‟ dollars, the symbolic representation of
Americans‟ hard work. The ideal charismatic right-wing populist leader is the main character of
LaBruzzo‟s narrative: the person who brings our country back to what it was founded on, selfsufficiency and individualism.
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Equality of Opportunity
The respondents overwhelmingly interpreted equality of opportunity racially, although
they differed on how much race affects life chances. Most respondents framed equality of
opportunity in terms of formal equality - in terms of the current laws on the books - rather than
substantive equality, which takes into account the effect of ascribed statuses. This distinction
affects perception of equality of opportunity in 21 st Century America. The Bucktonians
interviewed fell into one of three categories. Either they believe equality of opportunity has not
been achieved; has been basically achieved; or, has been lost because of racial quotas and other
minority set-asides that disadvantage whites.
Andrew, a graduate student and soon to be professional in his twenties who opposes
LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive, uses substantive equality to explain equality of opportunity.
He says,
most big corporations just - I think [in] the society we live in,
minorities are not treated the same and not hired the same rate as
everyone else. Women are about fifty percent, but still, you can‟t
tell me that any CEO of a company, white male CEO of a
company, is not going to be more prejudiced to a black person than
a white person. I guess the hippie answer would be that
“everybody is equal, whatever.” Still, they don‟t think like that.
You‟ll never convince me to think like that. Look at NCAA
football coaches. What is it, 97 percent are white. And those are
big paying jobs and it still has to do with prejudice in our society.
Andrew seems to hold no doubts about the persistence of racial discrimination in the U.S. despite
laws that claim all citizens are equal. Andrew‟s beliefs about the effects of racial discrimination
differ substantially from the other respondents. For example, his grandfather Carl, an elderly,
retired professional believes America is a meritocracy. Carl believes “the person who has the
most education is going to get the job,” regardless of race. Both Carl and Andrew oppose
Labruzzo‟s proposal.
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The second group of Bucktonians minimizes racial discrimination, that is, they suggest
“discrimination is no longer a central factor affecting minorities‟ life chances” (Bonilla-Silva
2003: 29). They believe equality of opportunity has been basically realized. For example, Frank,
a middle-aged manager believes, “you‟re always going to have that certain percentage of
assholes, but I think 97 percent. Yeah, there is equal opportunity for all Americans.” The
assholes Frank is referring to are “bigots [and] racists.” He doesn‟t believe “there are enough of
them to interfere with anything. They may interfere with a few individual‟s lives, but not society
as a whole. They‟re basically a small minority.” Frank attributes racial discrimination to a
bygone era.
Likewise, Michelle believes equality of opportunity has basically been realized. Her
response to whether or not equality of opportunity exists:
Um, I would say so. I think probably in some cases some people
are kind of prejudiced or afraid to take in certain people [because]
they might be lazier or they may sue them because…they
might…say “well you were prejudiced, I‟m going to sue you.” So
maybe a few people are afraid…but mostly I think it‟s equal.
We‟re coming a long way.
Michelle sympathizes with the plight of employers who have to fear the prejudice label when all
they want to do, she claims, is cultivate a staff of hard workers. Equality, then, results in a
situation where the best employees do not necessarily get the job. Michelle supports Rep.
LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive.
The fourth group of Bucktonians believe that equality of opportunity has been surpassed
because minorities are unfairly advantaged though affirmative action programs. For example,
Luke said, “they need to make all opportunity equal. Give everybody a chance.” Luke believes
minorities have an unfair advantage. Luke supports John LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive.
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Likewise, Lucy believes “the most discriminated person now is a white male.” Lucy
justifies how males make more money than females for doing the same jobs, how most CEO‟s
are white males, and how white family‟ incomes are much higher than blacks. She asks,
Did those white families go to school? Did those white families go
to college?...There was a law passed before either of us were born
that every child is entitled to an education regardless of race, color
or whatever. So what makes them any different than anybody else?
Lucy points to the current laws to indicate the existence of equality of opportunity. When you
add affirmative action programs to the mix, the scale is tilted in favor of minorities.
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Poverty, Welfare and the Work Ethic
Why should we keep paying for six and seven children when I‟m struggling myself, living here
alone with no husband, on a fixed income and not on welfare?
-Minnie from Bucktown

Although the respondents had varying views on equality of opportunity, they all used
more than one of the following frames to explain poverty and welfare: poverty results from a
lack of hard work, generational welfare-dependency, and deserving versus undeserving poor.
Poverty is a lack of hard work
Feldman‟s (1982) study of 1,119 Americans found that those who believe in economic
individualism - that economic mobility can be gained through hard work - and the existence of
equality of opportunity results in them not locating the cause of their financial well-being in the
social structure.
The Bucktonian respondents view themselves as hard workers. In addition, more than
half of the immediate families I spoke with were upwardly mobile. They attribute their success in
life to hard work and thrift. For example, Don, a small business owner with less than a high
school education, has two children who are professionals and a grandchild that is a professional.
He explains how this occurred: “[I] never had the chance to go to school. [I] always had to
work...I guess I could have went to school later on…but I wanted to see my kids get a good
education.” Don says he worked hard. Now his family is successful by American standards.
Andrew echoes Don‟s sentiments. Andrew talked about the most important life lesson he
has learned. He said,
My dad always stressed that you only get what you work for and
that hard work is the only option in life. And there‟s no getting
around it. And if you want to be successful, that‟s the only way to
get it. That was pretty much the main thing stressed to me
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throughout my whole life – you‟re not going to get anywhere
without hard work.
By all American standards, Andrew appears successful. He will soon be earning a six figure pay
check. But, according to Andrew, this has not always been his life trajectory.
I could have easily just become a poor person by not going to
school. I wasn‟t going anywhere in life and I probably would have
a run of the mill, lower class job. Not that I‟m going to be making
much money or anything, but if I would not have made the right
decision in my life and stop using drugs and move towards a
positive direction, I wouldn‟t be not poor.
Andrew credits the success in his life to his work ethic and sacrifice, which he says were taught
to him by his father.
Although the respondents use individualism to explain their financial situation, they
attributed poverty to both individual and structural factors. When asked why people are poor,
Andrew struggled to give a definitive answer, but eventually concluded,
I think what a lot of people probably feel too - that they don‟t have
the drive and the will to do what others want to do…I think it has a
lot to do with substance abuse. I think the majority of them are
substance abusers. Is it because they are poor? Or is it the reason
they‟re poor? I don‟t know. I guess you always have to look at the
fact they probably grew up poor and they were comfortable with
the way they live. So, if you‟re comfortable with way you live,
you‟re comfortable with way you live so…
Although Andrew believes that discrimination denies equality of opportunity and recognizes the
role of socialization, he ultimately suggests that the poor make a decision to remain poor.
Other respondents explained poverty structurally through generational welfaredependency and the culture of poverty1 that decreases life chances for those born into the
underclass. According to Michelle, people are poor because
they won‟t get out and get their ass a job. They‟re lazy. Um,
education. I tell you, nowadays you can go to Burger King and
they‟re paying pretty good from the storm, huh? Get a job, that‟s
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all I‟ve got to say. It‟s an easy thing to do, if you want to work. But
if you don‟t have to get a work and you still get a check, why go to
work, huh?
Michelle locates the structural cause of poverty in the incentive for laziness created by welfare
programs, particularly cash assistance.
Generational Welfare-dependency
The aim of Rep. LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive was to alleviate the culture of poverty,
the perceived unwelcome side effect of generational welfare-dependency. The respondents
overwhelmingly agreed that welfare-dependency weakens the work ethic. Because of the
Bucktonians‟ lived experience of hard work leading to upward mobility, a change in welfare
policy is tantamount to an attack on inducements to generational laziness. Minnie explained why
people are poor:
I want to say [the] majority is the way they were raised. Their
parents didn‟t better themselves, didn‟t try to better themselves.
So, therefore the children don‟t try to better themselves. You
know, they got seven kids, and they didn‟t use birth control! And
therefore they had lots of children. They didn‟t know and they
struggled to raise these children and then what did these children
do but turn around and do the same thing and then their children
did the same thing. Fortunately enough, there are some that
overcome it and, you know, say “I‟m gonna do better,” I was poor,
and I don‟t want to live that way. My parents didn‟t have anything
and I don‟t want to go back there. I made sure my son, you know,
had better than I had and he‟s trying to make sure his girls have
better than he has. But you got to work at it. You can‟t be lazy.
Minnie credits the cause of poverty to structural factors – the lack of motivation and
irresponsibility passed down from generation to generation. She accounts for the upward
mobility of her family with generational diffusion of a strong work ethic. Her tone intensifies as
she condemns the poor decisions these families make.
And a lot of it‟s drugs. I have to say that. A lot of it‟s drugs. So
you don‟t want to work, [because] you‟re doing drugs all day. How
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are you getting drugs? Well, you rob and steal or your parents are
giving you money. They don‟t realize you‟re messed up. Also back
to the poorness. In the city, they‟re not made to go to school, you
know? There you go. So these kids are not educated. So they‟re
taught to hate whites and you know, don‟t go to school. It isn‟t
worth it you know and then they hang in the streets. So there,
that‟s generations out the window. And there is exceptional ones
that come out and say “I saw that lifestyle and chose that I wasn‟t
going to live like that and I was going to better myself” and that‟s
wonderful. But the majority of these children, they let them stay
home from school and they don‟t teach them right. They let them
talk bad, no manners, talk ugly to the police. So what do you
expect a child to do when they‟re raised like that? There‟s no hope.
I don‟t think New Orleans will ever straighten up, not New
Orleans.
Rep. LaBruzzo‟s generational welfare-dependency frame resonates with Minnie‟s ideology,
because of its experiential commensurability and centrality. Where Minnie seemingly differs
from Rep. LaBruzzo is her racialized explanation of poverty. She talks about blacks‟ ignorant
hatred of whites and the failure of their parents to teach them how to survive in American society
- having manners; not “talking bad”; not “talking ugly to the police.” For Minnie, the culture of
poverty seems to be a defect in black culture.
In addition to framing poverty as a lack of hard work stemming from generational
welfare-dependency, the respondents separate the deserving and undeserving poor as they make
sense of the social problems engendered by generational welfare through an individualist lens.
Deserving vs. Undeserving Poor
The respondents made two distinctions between those who are deserving of welfare and
those who are not: ableness versus disableness and lazy parent versus potential productive child.
According to the respondents, the disabled are worthy of the middle and working classes‟
symbolic labor (tax dollars), while those who are physically and mentally capable are considered
undeserving. Frank tells me
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If you describe the poor as having no income, then the government
could help support them, but they should earn the money
somehow. If they are at a medium income, they should work
harder to make more money. I don‟t think the government should –
just because you‟re poor- it depends on what your standard of poor
is. If you‟re handicapped and poor, if you can‟t work physically
and mentally, I think the government should help you. But, if you
are physically and mentally able to work, I don‟t think the
government should support you.
Frank invokes his own personal experience as an able-bodied, non-welfare receiving individual
to explain his view.
As far as welfare, from the standpoint that someone‟s handicapped
and can‟t work or anything, I agree with it. But, when a person can
go out and work and make a living, I don‟t agree with giving the
man money for doing nothing. So, I don‟t really agree with
welfare. But I‟ve never been in that position where I needed to
accept welfare. So, I guess from that standpoint, I‟ve never
experienced it. If things turned out different in life and I needed
welfare, then I might think different, but I‟ve never needed it, but I
don‟t agree with giving people money and them not earning it, so,
or benefits without earning it somehow, unless they are unable to physically, mentally, then I agree with it. Does that make sense to
you?
Frank principally disagrees with welfare, with giving someone something for nothing. He
recognizes that he may feel different if it were in his interest to support welfare programs; that is,
if he were to receive welfare benefits, then he would support welfare. Ultimately, Frank has
compassion for those who are physically or mentally unable to work. The disabled were not the
only groups respondents considered deserving of welfare.
The Bucktonians interviewed also had compassion for the elderly and the children of lazy
welfare recipients as well. Lucy says
…the government should help kids. The government shouldn‟t
help adults who don‟t want to work. The government should take
care of our elderly and kids that need it. I don‟t want to see any
child go hungry and I don‟t want to see any lady like Mrs. [Jones]
not have heat in her house or food on the table.
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I reminded Lucy that the welfare funds would have to pass through the parents in order to reach
the children in need that she had such compassion for. Her response was as follows:
I don‟t know. That‟s a dilemma, but I don‟t think any child should
go hungry. I don‟t think any child should be deprived of an
education or - and they don‟t in the pub school system. They have
to give every child what they need. I don‟t know what the answer
is to that. I know that I don‟t think we should support the mothers.
They should go out and get a job. If they have 6 kids, they need to
go out and support 6 kids. I don‟t know. I guess that‟s why they get
food stamps and stuff like that, but I don‟t believe in helping them,
because they can help themselves.
Like most Bucktonians interviewed, Lucy has some degree of ambivalence about how to deal
with poverty. Studies suggest this ambivalence is a larger trend among conservatives. Gainouss‟s
(2008) study of 500 Florida voters revealed that conservatives are generally more ambivalent
than liberals in evaluating social welfare programs, especially programs that improve the
standard of living for the poor. The most powerful explanation of ambivalence is conflicting
attitudes towards perceived beneficiaries: blacks and the poor. Lucy believes that poverty is
ultimately a result of irresponsibility on the part of parents and, therefore, welfare recipients who
can work are undeserving of taxpayers‟ money. Nonetheless, she shows compassion for the
children for whom the welfare payments are intended.

End Notes
1. The culture of poverty refers to the idea that the poor have a unique value system as a result of
their material conditions. See Oscar Lewis‟s Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture
of Poverty (1959) for further discussion.
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Racial Ideology
“Well I don‟t mind, you know, helping them get ahead just so long as we can get them off the
welfare. If we finally get a pattern where we have you know a race that gets educated and they
can continue to do that to their offspring, you know, that‟d be wonderful…I just don‟t want to…
ride a mile from here and watch…Willy sitting on his porch…taking all of our money!...And
we‟re struggling. I‟m buying, we‟re buying, no-name shit at the store, excuse my French, so that
he can stay at home on his porch and get the welfare. It‟s just not right! It really isn‟t right. We
really need a change!”
-Michelle from Bucktown

Although the most consistent predictor of means-tested welfare attitudes is political
ideology (Groskind 1994; Schneider and Jacoby 2005; Gainouss 2008), other variables explain
attitudes towards welfare. Hasenfeld and Rafferty‟s (1989) study of 919 housing units in Detroit
found that race of respondent, age and income had a statistically significant affect on attitudes
towards means-tested welfare. Hasenfeld and Rafferty (1989) conclude that because whites are
less structurally disadvantaged, they are less likely to support means-tested welfare programs
than blacks.
All of the Bucktonian respondents were white. In fact, 95% of all Bucktonians are white
(see Table 7). This is a significantly higher percentage of whites than the nation as a whole
(75%) or Louisiana (63%). In addition, blacks make up less than one percent of all Bucktonians.
This is significantly less than the nation as a whole (12%) and Louisiana (33%), yet
understandable because neighborhood racial segregation is quite common. Bucktown‟s low
percentage of minorities seems less a result of a natural tendency for people to flock to their own
and more a result of concerted efforts on the part of whites to keep minorities out of Bucktown.
Minnie, a first-wave Bucktonian, shared a story of what Bucktown was like in the Jim
Crow Era. According to Minnie, Buck Wooley, the “founder” of Bucktown and the former
village‟s namesake,
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would stand at that bridge. And there were no blacks...[when] I
was a little girl, we had to go get [Susie], the lady who worked
[here], because they didn‟t walk the streets. You couldn‟t walk the
streets, even though the people knew she was [Susie]. She was
scared to walk the streets and to walk down Hammond Highway to
catch the bus from Orpheum Avenue. They wouldn‟t do it. You
had to go pick up your help, because they weren‟t allowed to
come. They were scared for their life. They were always known
to…not come in Bucktown, or that‟s it. You weren‟t going to make
it out. And I‟m not saying that was right…but that‟s how they were
in those days. And that‟s changed, thank goodness, that, you know,
everybody‟s supposed to be getting along. So, it is different out
here now.
Thus, it appears Bucktown has remained white by protecting its borders through intimidation
tactics.
Responses among other Bucktonians indicate that racial prejudice still remains. I asked
Luke, a member of a first wave Bucktonian family, what he liked about Bucktown. He told me
the following:
Bucktown, it‟s easy. They‟re ain‟t a lot of trash. Of course you‟re
going to have your Bucktown hillbillies, but that‟s every so often.
There‟s a lot of nice people around here. It‟s comfortable.
Bucktown is home. [What do you mean when you say there‟s not a
lot trash. So you mean like post-Katrina trash in the 9th Ward?]
Well yeah, pretty much. They don‟t have a lot of coloreds.
Bucktown is good for keeping a lot of that out, not to be racist or
anything.
When I asked Luke about the post-Katrina trash in the 9th Ward, I was referring to the ubiquitous
mounds of debris. What Luke was referring to was an inferior group of people.
Racial Preferences Are Natural
In May of 2008, a black family moved into Bucktown. Four days later they found that
“KKK” had been burned in large, clear letters across one half of their lawn at 1500 Homestead
Ave. In response, Catholic, Presbyterian, Episcopal, Methodist, Jewish, and Islamic church
leaders as well as non-religious community leaders came together to “uproot hate, celebrate
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freedom” and re-sod the family‟s lawn where “KKK” was burned. Among those not attending
were state representative John LaBruzzo and representatives of the local Catholic Church, St.
Louis King of France, lending weight to the critique that John LaBruzzo‟s proposal was an
attempt to pander to his constituents as well as the suspicion that the KKK burning was not
altogether unwelcome.
Lucy finds her neighbors‟ attempt to “uproot hate” by planting new grass where “KKK”
was burned inauthentic. She had the following to say:
No, all of our neighbors went out there and helped them plant the
grass. And you can‟t tell me that. I don‟t buy that they were all
apologetic. And why should we apologize for something
somebody else did…[Sarah‟s] husband or boyfriend went over
there. He went and he works for Orleans Parish. He‟s a fireman for
Orleans. And most New Orleans firemen that are white, oh, they
can‟t stand them, because they‟re getting reverse discrimination
with the fire chief and all that B.S. I‟ve got a good friend of
mine…his dad‟s a chief in Orleans and they don‟t want him to
retire because he‟s the last white chief that‟s left. Yeah, but I don‟t
think they did it as a, I don‟t know why people did it, but, I mean,
c‟mon, you know? I don‟t know why people did that, but I don‟t
think they should be living in this neighborhood because its not…I
wouldn‟t move in a black neighborhood. Would you move in a
black neighborhood? C‟mon, you‟re the only white people, are you
going to move over there?
Although she does not condone the “KKK” burning, the mention of the burning prompts a more
abstract discussion of oppression of whites, namely reverse discrimination and the demonization
of whites who choose to live segregated. She hypothesizes that the burning was youthful
indiscretion among the fishermen children who had such discrimination “inbred to them by their
parents.” She refers to an extreme reference point, the fishermen, to place her views within the
realm of reasonable and acceptable discourse. She wonders why blacks don‟t want to live
among their own.
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Reverse Discrimination
Although Bucktonians have disabused themselves of David Duke, they retain a similar
white rights ideology. They use the same frames to explain racial inequality as David Duke
supporters did when interviewed twenty years ago by Multi Quest International. For example,
Lucy said,
the most discriminated person now is a white male. You‟re at the
bottom of the list to get anything…[White males] have less of a
chance now, especially now…that we have the new president. I‟m
sorry but I definitely think the white male is going to be the most
discriminated person against now, especially in the South.
Lucy‟s interpretation of racial inequality in the post-Obama presidency era bears a striking
resemblance to David Duke‟s interpretation nearly twenty years ago. The pro-white cause is
linked with the “rights” master frame (which was more commonly used by structurally
disadvantaged groups) to attack what many respondents see as the injustices of affirmative action
and minority set asides. That is, to combat oppression of whites.
This ideology is passed down through generations. For example, consider the frames used
by aunt and nephew, Minnie and Luke. Minnie says, “I‟m tired of mostly all the blacks getting
everything, the African-Americans getting everything and the Caucasian, white, the CaucasianAmericans aren‟t getting anything.” Her nephew, Luke, tells me, “they need to make everybody
equal, not have minorities and all that stuff.” Although many of the respondents share the belief
that reverse discrimination disadvantages whites, only one out of nine Bucktonians interviewed
admitted to supporting David Duke.
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Mild White Supremacy
The respondents distinguish their behavior from the aggressiveness and violence of the
KKK. As a result, they do not see similarities between their ideology and David Duke‟s
ideology. Carl, who rejected LaBruzzo‟s policy suggestion for religious reasons, states
I‟m amazed that he got as many votes as he did, but he was getting
votes from many people who thought like the KKK did. They were
strictly anti-Negro. They were pro white supremacist. Americans
shouldn‟t think like that. Most Americans don‟t think like that.
Now I may think I‟m a little better than a black person. Is that
wrong? That‟s the way I feel.
Although Carl thinks he is “a little better than a black person,” he does not advocate violence to
maintain the racial order. He uses the symbols of KKK and David Duke as extreme reference
points to place his views within the realm of reasonable, humane and acceptable beliefs and
therefore escape demonization by mainstream society.
Carl's son Frank does not hold symbols of racial extremism in high regard either. He
recalls what it was like growing up in Bucktown before David Duke had been discredited.
[W]hen I was growing up, he was kind of like, I don‟t know if you
considered him a hero - not somebody I looked up to. We were, I
was raised by a family that had a plantation and a lot of old timers
in that area didn‟t like blacks in the neighborhood, and that was
where I was raised at, so 50/50. I thought he was alright, but that‟s
the way I was raised. Right now I think he was ridiculous. I‟m not
a racist. I don‟t hate blacks, but there was a lot of feeling around,
disliking blacks in the neighborhood when we were growing up.
Although Frank does not refer to himself as better than a black person, he does admit to having
Duke sympathies in his younger days. Like his father, and many Bucktonian respondents, Frank
credits his racial ideology to the time and place he was raised. Carl grew up in the Jim Crow
South. Everywhere he went, blacks and white were separated. Frank grew up in the waning days
of Jim Crow and the early days of the Civil Rights era, which provided the impetus for white
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rights activists like Duke to gain a foothold in political life. Frank spent most of his youth in
Bucktown and the surrounding, white-dominated Metairie area. He only saw black people on
trips to Mississippi and when he attended a Catholic school in New Orleans. Frank attributes
such racial sentiment to bygone history. Like when he emphasizes that “right now, I think
[Duke] was ridiculous.”
Three Techniques Used to Avoid the “Racist” Label
Those who discredit blacks still identify as non-racist by appealing to an extreme
reference point. They discuss a relationship they have with a minority or redefine “racism”
strictly as biological racism (Bonilla-Silva 2003). They do so in an effort to escape
demonization by mainstream society, which appears to them to be racist hunting (Bonilla-Silva
2003).
Not all Bucktonians think David Duke is ridiculous. I asked Minnie what she thought
about David Duke. She told me
I thought he, I think he‟s great…But then that makes me
prejudiced again. See? I think he had a lot of good ideas! But
because of who he was…nobody wanted to listen to his ideas
because he was prejudiced. They were good ideas, but he was
prejudiced. Just like Labruzzo‟s idea, it‟s a good idea, but…you
have to twirk it a little bit. Nobody is going to pass it.
Indeed, those who discredit blacks fear the “racist” label more than they shun racist beliefs. In
this new racial discourse, the “racist” becomes another extreme reference point, much like David
Duke or the KKK. These symbols function to place the beliefs of those who discredit blacks
within the realm of reasonable, humane and acceptable beliefs. By defining racists as other than
themselves, people that discredit blacks have developed a non-racist identity, such as when
Minnie defends LaBruzzo‟s proposal from the Duke stigma.
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The second technique used to identify as non-racist while holding blacks discreditable is
having a relationship with a black person and reminding people of it. Michelle uses this
technique as she shares her thoughts on Barack Obama being elected president.
Well, I mean, why do we have to say this is our first black
president. Why is there so much hype on him being black? I mean
he‟s not all black. He‟s black and white. We‟re not credited for the
white part of him, are we? We‟re always supposed to be ashamed
of being white. We cannot be proud of our heritage…It‟s always
about…the black history month; it‟s about this black college. We
can‟t have just a white college…it‟s always about the blacks. [Why
do you think that is?] Because of our past ancestors that screwed us
over, making them slaves, that‟s why! But why should I, we have
to pay for it? My son could probably be riding in the car and cut
maybe, cut too close to one and he‟s going to blow his brains out
because my son‟s ancestors had slaves, you know. That‟s what
really makes me angry. Now I am, my niece is married to a black
man and he‟s very nice. Their whole family‟s nice. I‟m not
prejudiced. But…enough is enough, let it go. Let‟s move on. Yeah,
let‟s celebrate your history month about…but don‟t make us pay
for it…Let‟s move on. It‟s time that we moved on…we really need
to educate, extremely educate because this welfare is pulling us in
a, like a big drain hole, giving it all to them.
Perceiving themselves as far removed from the normalized, gross racial injustices of past
generations and the financial privileges afforded by it, some middle and working class white
families have come to resent the special attention paid to blacks intended to offset such
injustices. Michelle wants to forget about slavery and Jim Crow. She thinks that the focus needs
to be placed on the social problems that what she sees as black privilege creates: laziness and
violence in the black community. She demonizes low income blacks as impetuous violators
whose anger is fed by something that happened 150 years ago. She scapegoats low-income
blacks as a major cause of the devolution of society. In the same paragraph she asserts that she is
not prejudiced. The reason: she has a nephew-in-law that is black. Her sister-in-law, who also
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used the extreme reference point technique of racist label aversion, referred to her relationship
with the same black man to deny her prejudice.
Minnie continued to express her discontent with the prejudice labels that have been
placed on good whites who do not like minority set-asides. She does so without fear of being
targeted as a racist by defining racism narrowly. This all came out as she further articulated her
support for David Duke.
I thought [David Duke] had good ideas. Now did I want to see him
hang people and all of that? No. I‟m not a Ku Klux Klan person or
anything but I thought David Duke… I voted for him, I definitely
voted for him. And I mean it‟s a lot of people… I‟m sure you
know the history of Bucktown...Blacks weren‟t allowed in
Bucktown...I‟m sure you know about Mr. Buck standing at the 17th
Street Canal Bridge and not letting any blacks in the city, into
Bucktown. [If you were black], you did not walk in Bucktown. I
mean five, ten years ago, if you were still walking out here and
something happened in Bucktown and you were black and you
walked the streets, you got jumped and asked what you were doing
in this neighborhood. So it‟s kind of hard to sit here and say I‟m
not a prejudiced person when I was brought up in all of this. But, I
still don‟t think I‟m a prejudiced person. [A] prejudiced person, to
me, hates blacks and doesn‟t want them to get ahead and you hate
them for everything just like you hate a Yankee or the Southerners
hate the south. I‟m not that type of person...[I] try to give
everybody a chance. But if you‟re on welfare after a year, the
chance is over.
Indeed the fear of the “racist” stigma is an imminent threat to the identity of those who discredit
blacks, whether conscious or not. For Minnie, racism is extreme - hating blacks for existing.
For Minnie, racism is biological racism. Believing blacks are culturally inferior doesn‟t fit into
the racist category.
Cultural Racial Frames
The reasons why one discredits minorities separates biological racism and color-blind
racial ideology. Biological racists are like Lionel J.D. Jones D.D.S., a character in Vonnegut‟s
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“Mother Night” (1966), who believes he can prove inferiority among blacks and Jews by
examining their dental structures. Biological racism has run its course with the mainstream
collective conscience1, although these beliefs survive on the fringe among radical hate groups
such as the Ku Klux Klan and White Power Skinheads. Color-blind racists, on the other hand, do
not discredit minorities for existing; rather, they discredit minorities for their culture.
The respondents‟ cultural racial frames were not used to explain a totalizing black
culture; rather, they used cultural explanations to explain how low-income black culture is
different in a way that decreases their life chances. However, they do not believe low-income
blacks should be held to different standards, because they perceive the decreased life chances of
low-income blacks through the lens of formal equality afforded by a meritocracy wherein status
is more achieved than ascribed. They assert that low-income blacks are not given the tools to
succeed in America, although they sometimes perceive this as a result of the structure of lowincome black welfare culture, not the overall structure of American society; and other times, as
the result of the overarching structure of American society via the exchange of tax dollars from
political elites to low-income black welfare recipients.
For example, Lucy elaborated on the low-income black welfare culture as she explained
why blacks would not accept John LaBruzzo‟s sterilization proposal.
It‟s just a way of life for them…to knock the white man or to say
that they are trying to control us. So do I think that they would take
the programs? Absolutely not. So, even though it might be a good
program, for one thousand dollars, you‟re going to have the black
minister in the back telling them, “why are you going to take the
thousand dollars one time, when you can get tens of thousands of
dollars over x amount of period of time, because you have so many
kids.” And that‟s a way of increasing the number of black people
in America. [Do you think to increase the number of black people
in America is a goal of these black ministers?] Yeah, I think that‟s
part of it. [Why do you think that is?] Because they‟re not
encouraging people not to. They‟re not taking any kind of steps to
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teach kids to abstain, to show them what a life they could have if
they wait. Not to never have kids, but to wait until they can go to
college and support them. Everybody can go to college now. It‟s
not like you can‟t. You know everybody can go. You can get Pell
Grants, T.O.P.P.S. So no, do you think they‟re doing that?…I
don‟t think they try hard enough. All they want to do is say, “no
it‟s government” or “the white person.”…They don‟t have an
outlet for them to teach them better. If these kids didn‟t have kids
at 16; if they waited to have kids until they could at least get out of
high school; they‟d, stand a better chance. Don‟t you think?
Lucy has empathy for the children of structurally disadvantaged blacks. According to Lucy‟s
frame, blacks have not been educated properly but that has nothing to do with white
discrimination; they have not been taught how to succeed.
This characterization of black culture results in an assimilationist racial ideology that
informs adherents that blacks‟ life chances would increase if they just lived more like whites.
Often the cultural products – dress, hairstyle, etc. – signify bad blacks. Lucy said,
It‟s different up [North]. I was sitting at a restaurant in
Pennsylvania somewhere and it was during football season and this
guy had on an Eagles jersey…I‟m more into college ball than I am
pro ball and I was just asking him about the college teams…It was
just like having a conversation like you and I are; but to do that
here, you just couldn‟t here…I work with a couple black
people…They are black to a point and then get them away
from…a work environment and they‟re like strictly ghetto. I don‟t
get that either. [You don‟t have any explanations?] I think they‟re
trying to be something that they‟re not. [When are they pretending
to be something that they‟re not?] Well, at work…because they
come in with all kinds of earrings in and their grill and as soon as
they come to work they take it off and put it all away. And when
they leave, they put it all back on. [Why do you think that they‟re
trying to be something different at work?] I guess to fit into the
white society, but why can‟t it be one?...They have the job already.
I don‟t know. I just think that you should be one way. Why pretend
to be someone that you‟re not?
Lucy is clearly not a biological racist. She looks back favorably on her conversation with the
northern black man who can afford to take plane trips. On the other hand, Lucy is frustrated by
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the line her black coworker takes. She seems to wish he could be more like the man she drank a
beer with in Pennsylvania and not so “ghetto.” It is in the separation of good blacks and bad
blacks that the influence of class on racial ideology is most prominent. Put simply, good blacks
have money and are more educated. As a result they have more in common with middle-class
whites. She locates the cause of poverty in the individual, yet she demonizes low-income blacks
in general for not maintaining consistency in self-presentation.
Political Correctness
In May of 2009, the black family who had “KKK” burned across their lawn in Bucktown,
had “White Power” and a swastika painted on the road in front of their house (see Figure 3). The
anniversary of the hate crime did not receive publicity.
Several respondents are tired of the politically correct culture that inconveniences the
normal flow of interaction experienced by whites in the past. They are tired of having to be
culturally sensitive to blacks and minorities. Although she does not condone the “KKK” burning
and the “White Power” painting, Lucy is frustrated that her friend cannot use the abbreviation
“KKK” to signify his three daughters whose names all begin with the letter “K.”
…he used to list them on the pool as “K.K.K.”, but he took them
off now. Now, he just puts “the girls.” [Where?]…On my football
pool. He used to have, his three girls all begin with “K”, so he had
“KKK.” on there. Well the square next to him is one of the guys at
my office and he‟s black, so he took it off to be politically correct.
Instead of putting “K.K.K.,” he put “the girls”; which I think is
stupid, totally stupid…We have to be politically correct today and
that‟s just crazy. Certain things that used to mean absolutely
nothing ten years ago mean, you can‟t say them anymore…[Do
you think he got a kick out of putting K.K.K. on there?] No, he did
it completely innocent. Like I said, racism is alive and well in
New Orleans, but if you‟re fair and upfront with everybody and
you don‟t pull any side punches, I think most people will be fair
and upfront with you, regardless of your color, in most cases... It‟s
just the person. It‟s not the race. It‟s the person...The guy shouldn‟t
have to not put “KKK.” He‟s doing that because that‟s his girls and
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they all begin with “KKK,” but it can represent something else.
You can‟t put that. Is that fair to him? No, but does he really care?
Does that really bother him? No, but he just did it so he didn‟t have
to hear anybody say anything.
Lucy‟s narrative makes a man who wants to use “KKK” to signify his bet on a football pool into
a victim. The aggressor is the politically correct culture of overly sensitive blacks and liberal
whites. Lucy shrugs off the association between violent behavior and the symbol, “KKK,” with
an appeal to equality of opportunity.
Only one interviewee identified as racist. He had the following to say about what he
meant when he said he is a little racist:
I don‟t like that they wrote KKK on the only black person‟s lawn
in the neighborhood around the corner. I think it‟s, I think the
people in this community are too racist for their own good,
including my own father. I‟m a little bit racist, but not to the fact
where I hate a whole race of people… [What does that mean to
you to say you are a bit racist?] Sometimes I think like, “fucking
nigger.” I say it in my head. I don‟t say it out loud. Then I‟ll think
five minutes later, “why‟d I think like that? Why‟d I act like that?”
Sometimes it gets the best of me and it‟s just engrained in me to
think like that. It‟s no excuse, but I definitely do feel that way
sometimes. I definitely shouldn‟t say it. I should just be saying
“idiot” to the person, not the race. [You say it‟s engrained in you.
What do you mean?] Everyone in my family is racist...Any family
function I go to… [“nigger” is] always going to be thrown around
no matter wherever it is. It‟s usually the men who throw it around,
not the women. I think it‟s predominately a male aggression type
thing. [Why do you think that is?] Because it makes males feel
cooler to talk down to people. And it‟s like their rite of passage
growing up in the South. You‟re mean to people who are a
different race than you and who are less fortunate than you because
that‟s what your daddy did and that‟s what his daddy did and so
on.
Andrew is hard on himself for having a racist moment, like when he sees a black person walking
slowly across a busy cross street with a green light. He habitually associates what he sees as
inconsiderate behavior to race, then upon introspection, recognizes the short-sightedness of his

68

reaction. He is aware of the lifelong socialization process that has made salient racial
explanations for behavior he disagrees with.

End Notes
1 Ritzer (2008) describes Emile Durkheim's notion of the collective conscience as “the general
structure of shared understandings, norms and beliefs” (79).
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Support and Opposition for Rep. LaBruzzo’s Sterilization Incentive
It is often forgotten that eugenics was considered a legitimate feature of the welfare state
in early 20th century America. In the Deep South, “physicians blamed the „insane‟ and the
„feeble-minded‟ for social problems.” As a result, these groups were statutorily sexually
segregated in state institutions (Dikotter 1998). Additionally, until World War II, mental health
hospitals practiced sterilization in the Deep South (Dikotter 1998). Since then, eugenics has
fallen out of favor as a means of social engineering. Explicit biological eugenics has come to be
associated with Adolf Hitler, the most nefarious character in the modern history of Western
civilization.
Sterilization plans can be understood on two spectrums: status of targets and method of
sterilization. On one pole of the status spectrum lies ascribed status groups. On the other lies
achieved status groups. The status of members of ascribed status groups is in no way related to
any choice they have made. Examples include race, gender and (dis)ability group. The status of
members of achieved status groups, on the other hand, is dependent in some way upon agency.
That is, the choices they make and the effort they put forth plays some role, however minor, in
their status. Examples include class1 and occupation. The other spectrum, target method of
sterilization, features coercion on one end and incentives on the other. Coercion does not offer
target groups a choice. Holding differences in agency among various groups constant, incentives
present a choice to target groups.
Early 20th century eugenics explicitly sought, through coercion, to decrease the fertility
rate among ascribed status groups, whereas David Duke‟s House Bill No.1584 and John
LaBruzzo‟s sterilization plans are framed as targeted for achieved status groups through
incentives. Nowadays, groups that positively value coercive approaches to decreasing the birth
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rate among either ascribed or achieved status groups (i.e. welfare recipients) through coercion
are only found on the fringes of society. Such groups are often labeled “hate groups.”
Interpreting Rep. LaBruzzo’s Sterilization Incentive Racially
Although Rep. LaBruzzo used a race neutral frame to diagnose generational welfaredependency and prognose incentivizing sterilization, the respondents overwhelmingly agreed
that the proposal was targeted at blacks. They view his sterilization incentive as targeted at
ascribed rather than achieved status groups.
Luke, who likes that Bucktown is absolutely certain that LaBruzzo‟s proposal was
targeted directly at blacks. He said,
…he meant it for the black people. [You think so?] Oh yeah that‟s
exactly what he meant. People need to stop worrying about the
black people… We really need to stop worrying about all the black
people, because if you think about it, there‟s more white people on
welfare…[So why do you think he was definitely talking about
black people when he said that?] Because black people are always
having babies and staying home and not doing shit.
Luke uses the cultural racial frame that blacks are lazy to explain why blacks and the poor are
almost interchangeable terms.
Like Luke, Andrew is certain that Rep. LaBruzzo was targeting black people. He had the
following to say about Rep. Labruzzo:
I know he proposed something about some; he made some bigoted
comment about blacks. Can you remind me about what he said
again? [I‟m not sure he said anything specifically, explicitly, about
blacks. But he said that he wanted to give $1000 dollars to lowincome people to get their tubes tied. Also, to give money to higher
income, more educated families to have kids, have more
kids.]…He‟s talking about minorities versus whites. Not just
blacks, but minorities.
Andrew does not point to statistics to show the overrepresentation of minorities on the welfare
rolls in Louisiana. Instead, his socially lived knowledge informs him that “people are racist.”
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Determining that John LaBruzzo was targeting minorities is a matter of “common sense” for
someone that at “any family function he go[es] to, [“nigger” is] always going to be thrown
around no matter wherever it is.” Andrew is a strong opponent of the proposal. He uses a
eugenics frame, that is, a coerced sterilization frame to oppose it.
Lucy agrees with Andrew in that she believes LaBruzzo‟s bill intentionally targets
minorities. She even has an explanation for why he put forth the proposal.
Oh I think he was definitely trying to be racist. [Why do you
think?]…I think he was trying to be racist because he made such of
an ass [of himself] because of that raise thing. He was trying to
cover himself, but he made it ten times much worse. He was trying
to get himself back in good graces with the white people who put
him in office…And look what he did. Look what he did. No white
person is going to come out and say…“yeah we‟re for John
LaBruzzo because he wants to do that.” They might vote for
him…People in Bucktown are racist, quite racist. You know that.
Look what they did to that guy‟s lawn over there. Did you see that?
Lucy refers to the KKK lawn burning to explain racist sentiments in Bucktown. It seems like
“common sense” to her that a local politician would push a sterilization proposal targeted at
blacks to pander to his/her Bucktown constituents.
Although Lucy expressed that Rep. LaBruzzo is purposely targeting blacks with money
to decrease their fertility and also that he was trying to be racist, she does not believe the
proposal is actually racist.
I don‟t think it‟s a racist comment. I think that he is trying to say
that hey, if you‟re going to have kids you need to support them. So
if you don‟t think you‟re going to support them, don‟t have them.
And here‟s a thousand dollar incentive to do that. That‟s what I
think. But now, some people might misinterpret that as being
racist. But there are a lot of white people who have kids that don‟t
support them. Here it‟s all black because, or a lot of, a majority of
it is black because we‟re attached really close to a city that‟s 5090% black. I don‟t even know what the rate is now. But the
majority of the country, most white people are on welfare because
it‟s mostly white people that live in the United States...Of course
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all the reverends and the black ministers are going to take it as a
racial comment. But one of their own just got arrested for crack
cocaine so I mean what makes them holier than…I don‟t know.
That‟s just my opinion.
Lucy asserts that the Bucktown community is “racist.” She admits that targeting blacks with
incentivized sterilization is an attempt to appease “racists.” But, she doesn‟t see the incentivized
sterilization itself as racist. Lucy protects LaBruzzo‟s proposal from racist labeling by asserting
that the essence of sterilization incentive issue is the choices made by welfare recipients. In other
words, she places LaBruzzo‟s proposal within the realm of reason and acceptability by framing
black poverty as individual failure rather than societal discrimination.
I asked Minnie why, although she agreed with the proposal, there was so much
opposition to incentivizing sterilization? Her response was as follows:
I guess they, I don‟t know, I guess they think it‟s not ethical to stop
someone from having children. I don‟t know if ethical would be
the right word, but I heard there was a lot of opposition and I heard
that people were in an uproar. But probably because the same thing
everything is, because it‟s blacks…Labruzzo said most of them are
white. So they can‟t turn around and say it‟s racial, but they will.
They‟ll turn right around and say that he‟s doing this or someone
else is doing this because it‟s racial. Everything‟s racial. [So you‟re
saying everything‟s racial?] Toward the blacks...I don‟t mean it‟s
racial. I mean the blacks say it is racial...“Oh, Labruzzo is doing it
because he‟s white.”…and “he‟s just doing it because most blacks
are on welfare.” But like they said, it isn‟t mostly blacks on
welfare. It‟s mostly whites on welfare, but they‟re not going to
believe that. They‟re going to believe it‟s just against [them]…It‟s
back to that. That‟s the same thing. It‟s always back to that.
Minnie uses a cultural racial frame to explain opposition to LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive.
To Minnie, blacks are overly sensitive about race issues; they interpret non-racial issues racially.
Support for LaBruzzo’s Sterilization Incentive
Although the respondents overwhelmingly interpreted the proposal racially, they all used
producerist and color-blind racial frames to explain their support. For example, to support the
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proposal, Luke appealed to the notion that there are too many people in the world. There was
mixed support for the proposal among the nine Bucktonian interviewees. One respondent did not
have an opinion on the matter. Of the other eight respondents, half (4/8) supported it and half
(4/8) opposed it.
A major area of concern is whether or not there is a choice for the recipient. Those who
support the proposal generally do so with some degree of ambivalence and uncertainty about
whether they view the proposal as coerced government control. This proposal embodies two
competing conservative appeals – the curbing of laziness and irresponsibility as well as the
freedom for individuals to make their own decisions without government interference. The
respondents were less ambivalent about this proposal‟s potential to reduce irresponsible births
among unproductive members of society than they were about whether the sterilization incentive
presents a choice rather than government control.
Michelle, a salesperson and former sales manager, typifies this ambivalence born of the
two competing conservative impulses.
I don‟t think they have the right to make people get their tubes tied.
I think that‟s a little crazy. It would be nice, you know, but I don‟t
think you can take somebody‟s rights like that away. I mean, what
do you do? How do you fix the situation where a lot of these
people are pushing out kids…and you don‟t want them to have all
of these kids? I would come up with a different program. Maybe
the more kids they have the less money they get. There must be
another way, you know…Because, what if you could stop them
from having so many kids if you make some sort of other
agreement and then this person ends a marriage and decides to go
into another marriage, and government has made them tie their
tubes so they can‟t have another child with someone else…What
gives them the right to decide that? [I don‟t think they have to get
their tubes tied; it‟s an incentive. So if you want to take the
thousand dollars…] Well then I don‟t mind that at all. I don‟t mind
that, because I‟m sure a lot of them are going to jump on the
bandwagon to get that money, don‟t you think?[I don‟t know.] I
agree with that if they‟re going to offer it to them. I was thinking
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that they didn‟t have a choice in the matter, that they were just
going to say, “well you got three kids and this is what you gotta
do.” But, if they have a right, I agree.
Michelle invokes the “rights” frame to defend those whose freedom she perceives may be
trampled on by the government. She agrees with LaBruzzo that something must be done about
“these people” having an irresponsible amount of children, but she does not agree with the
government coercing them to stop having children. Her opinion changes when I clarify for her
that the proposal calls for incentivizing tubal ligations and vasectomies rather than coercing
them.
…they have the right to choose you know whether they want the
money or not, you know. It‟s kind of like when we have a lot of
trouble with people trying to take “in God we trust” off our money
you know it‟s something like that you know. Church doesn‟t want
people to um, do things that they don‟t fully understand. Well they
don‟t fully understand what happens when they have all these
children too. So I agree that it‟s something pretty drastic is what
he‟s talking about, but it‟s pretty drastic what they put us in, you
know because we‟re making money and we‟re struggling, I mean
we‟re working our tails off for what? You know, for Uncle Sam to
take a lot of it to give it to the people that are just sitting on their
front porches not doing anything. We‟re paying for them…and
their children. That‟s not fair, but I don‟t want to see anybody
starve, either. I wouldn‟t want to see a little kid starve because the
parents were stupid.
When the criteria is met that government must not make decisions for individuals, she is free to
support a proposal that reduces the birth rate among welfare recipients. At this point, her concern
for a woman getting her tubes tied and then later wanting to have a child with a different father is
inconsequential. There is no forced government control and irresponsibility is curbed. Thus, her
support for LaBruzzo‟s proposal does not conflict with her ideology.
Minnie is unequivocal in her support for LaBruzzo‟s proposal.
They should have something to stop these people from having kids
that we‟re paying for, all this welfare… It‟s a good idea. Once you
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have two kids out of wedlock and they‟re on welfare, something
should be done. But how can you do that legally? You can‟t force
them to not have children. I can‟t believe they‟d want them
anyway after all these different men, but I guess the money‟s good.
Minnie alludes to the “perversity thesis of welfare” (Somers and Block 2005), which holds that
welfare creates rather than alleviates or softens the blow of poverty. This narrative characterizes
welfare programs as producers and enablers of a culture of poverty, rather than a form of social
support to keep people afloat as they work toward economic independence. It follows that the
poor must be set free from oppressive policies that strip them of the natural incentive to rise out
of poverty. Strategies to reduce welfare are not only morally justified, in so far as they liberate
the poor from the misguided, exploitive policies that function to keep them poor; they also serve
the interests of the hard-working taxpayers. Thus, John LaBruzzo‟s generational welfaredependency frame has narrative fidelity for Minnie – it fits in seamlessly with the perversity
narrative to make sense of complex social phenomena.
The effects of the perversity thesis do not come without empirical support. Groskind
(1994) examined the General Social Survey‟s random sample of 1,470 Americans who read ten
vignettes describing various families with incomes below the poverty line. Respondents were
then asked how much these families, who had between $50-100 weekly incomes, should receive
in financial support from the government. Those who believe welfare has negative effects on
recipients supported $1,000 dollars less per year than the average respondent.
Opposition to LaBruzzo’s Sterilization Incentive
Those disagreeing with the proposal framed the issue either in terms of religious beliefs,
negative valuation of eugenics or the work ethic. For example, Carl, an elderly, retired
professional, completely opposes the proposal for religious reasons.
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I think it‟s utterly ridiculous and obscene because of my religion.
This is what I was taught and this is what I believe. I‟m antiabortion. I‟m anti tying tubes. I‟m anti anything that‟s not natural.
I‟m really anti-birth control pills. I‟m anti anything that‟s not
natural. Natural would be people getting pregnant, people getting
married, having babies - after, not before marriage.
Although John LaBruzzo‟s generational poverty frame resonates with Carl‟s work ethic
ideology, Carl‟s strict Catholic pro-life values preclude his acceptance of LaBruzzo‟s proposal.
Carl‟s views are the same as Archbishop Hughes “blatantly anti-life” frame.
That a Catholic would oppose a right-wing populist proposal does not come as a surprise,
since Catholics have historically been the target of right-wing extremists. The 19th Century
Know Nothings and other anti-catholic nativists demonized Catholics because they were said to
be told how to think by local Catholic priests who took their orders from the Vatican, thus
upsetting the political order (Berlet and Lyons 2000). However, being Catholic proved an
unreliable predictor of attitudes towards LaBruzzo‟s proposal. Three out of seven Catholics
supported LaBruzzo‟s proposal. For them, the Catholic pro-life frame was trumped by other
more salient beliefs, such as the work ethic and democratic women‟s rights frame. For example,
Minnie, a not yet retired service worker in her sixties says, “I‟m a Catholic but I‟m not antiabortion. I believe every woman has a right to do what she wants to do with her body.”
Of course, most people do not hold pro-life sentiments to the same degree as Carl. Other
ideas account for their disapproval of the sterilization incentive. Paul, a salesman in his sixties
disagrees with LaBruzzo‟s proposal because he perceives it as inconsiderate.
I don‟t think it‟s a good idea, because I think there would be some
impulsive people who would just do it impulsively and be sorry for
it later when you can‟t have it undone. I don‟t think we should pay
for it anyway. I think people should be responsible enough to take
care of these things themselves. Use birth control or something. I
don‟t want my tax dollars going to that.
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Paul finds more than one fault with LaBruzzo‟s proposal. First, there is a lack of consideration
for the future. He is concerned that such a permanent decision may be made in haste by those
who are presently in need of money. Paul‟s second critique stems from his individualistic,
conservative values, his opposition to downward distribution of his tax dollars. Although other
conservatives perceive LaBruzzo‟s proposal as a welfare cost mitigation strategy – a way to
invest money now to save money and reduce social costs of welfare recipients in the long run –
Paul principally rejects government playing the role of caretaker. He rejects LaBruzzo‟s
pragmatic welfare cost mitigation strategy because of his libertarian ideals of principled selfreliance.
Another rejection was framed in eugenic terms. Andrew, a graduate student in his
twenties, says
I think it‟s kind of ridiculous. I think it‟s borderline Nazism to try
to eliminate a race or one quality of people and fund another. I
guess literally, fund another race or quality or social group of
people. I think he probably just ruined his political career by
saying that and you can‟t take him seriously from now on. I‟m sure
he was 100% confident in what he said, believes everything he
said, but I think he‟s a fucking idiot. I don‟t know if I ever voted
for him before but I wouldn‟t vote for him again.
Andrew‟s devaluation of subsidizing fertility for some groups and subsidizing sterilization
among others is most salient. The fact that recipients have the choice to accept or decline the
tubal ligation or vasectomy funds does not factor in. He is principally opposed to eugenics.
Andrew does not distinguish between coercive and incentivized sterilization methods, or
between ascribed and achieved status targets. He simply calls this incentivized sterilization
targeted at achieved status groups eugenics, in the same category of coercive sterilization
targeted at ascribed status groups.
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Support for Coerced Sterilization
Although four interviewees supported the incentive, only one believed it would be
effective. Lucy says,
I don‟t think they should get the money until they prove they have
the vasectomy or [tubal ligation]. That‟s what I think…I think that
would work. I don‟t think people should be made to do it, but I
think it would work; but I don‟t think you‟re going to get the
people that he‟s trying to reform. They‟re not going to be the
people that are willing to do it. I don‟t, I just don‟t think so…I
think the black community, for the guys, that‟s a notch on their belt
every time they have a kid. And who pays for that? We do.
Because they tell them, because I heard that black guy at work
[say], “you get money from the government.”… So again, the
white people would do it, but I don‟t think the black community
would do it. So, it‟s a nice idea if it would work, but I don‟t think
it‟s going to work; because I don‟t think you‟re going to get them
to take the money; but even if they did, it‟s reversible. So, you‟d
never get a black guy to get a vasectomy, because they‟d be too
afraid to…The audience that they‟re trying to attract with that is
not going to do that. [The audience being?] The black community.
Or the lower income. That‟s the better word for that, because it‟s
not just blacks that are on welfare; it‟s everybody. But you‟re not
going to attract that audience, because that‟s a paycheck for them
and free housing.
Lucy believes the sterilization incentive would work, but not the way it is intended to work. That
is, it would not decrease fertility among black welfare recipients. Lucy uses the cultural racial
frame that black males measure their virility by the amount of children they have to explain why
they would avoid exchanging reproductive capability for $1000. Furthermore, she asserts that in
pursing their self interest, black males would conclude that the welfare “paycheck” is worth
more than the $1000. Then, after explaining that the target recipients of the sterilization incentive
are black male welfare recipients, she corrects herself and asserts that she means low-income
people.
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Although Lucy expressed concerned that there should be a choice for recipients of the
sterilization incentive, she later differentiated between those she believes should maybe undergo
coerced sterilization and those who should not. She shared her thoughts on minors undergoing
sterilization.
…do I think 16 year old kids should do that? I don‟t know. And a
16 year old child, male or female, who both come from good
families and an accident just happened, I don‟t think that should be
for them. But when you go to a 16 year old who lives in the
projects, who has no family and it‟s just a cycle, then yeah I think
it should be.
Lucy takes welfare resentment to the extreme.

End Notes
1. Labeling class an indicator of achieved status can be somewhat controversial, since many
would argue that social mobility is more horizontal than vertical. However, America is not a pure
caste system. It is possible to rise in class, however rare this may be. The purpose of delimiting
achieved and ascribed status groups is to make clear that ascribed status groups have no agency
whatsoever in changing the status thrust upon them at birth whereas achieved status groups have
some agency in the status position they occupy.
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Ideological Welfare Knowledge
The respondents hold inaccurate beliefs about the current state of the welfare system in
America. They misunderstand the requirements and limitations placed upon receiving cash
payments and misinterpret the racial composition of those receiving cash payments. This
suggests their support for welfare reform is more ideological than empirical.
Overestimating the Welfare-dependency Incentive
Every interviewee used some version of the perversity thesis, which holds that welfare
creates rather than alleviates poverty, to frame their opposition to welfare programs. For
example, Carl said,
What I‟m saying is that a lot of people get on welfare. They‟re just
content to stay on welfare and they don‟t try to go out and find jobs
and find work so they could get off of these welfare rolls. In other
words, I think a lot of people need help, but it should really only be
temporary help until they could find work, but most of them don‟t
try to find work. They‟re content to stay on welfare.
Carl frames the welfare abuser as the rule rather than the exception. Paul has a similar
understanding of welfare. He stated the following:
I think that there are genuinely some that need [welfare]. Ok. I
think there are some that work the system, that don‟t want to work.
I think the Great Society of Lyndon Johnson caused a lot of
welfare recipients, caused a lot of crime. What you see today is
caused by one parent families where she may have six children
from six different men and she got paid for each one of them. So
she was getting money for each child, plus free rent, plus food
stamps. So she was living pretty good. These children [were] not
being parented. So your getting, what you see today is probably the
third generation of that because Johnson was in the „60s. You see
the third generation of that - the grandmother, the mother and the
kids. Okay. What you‟re seeing today is that two fifteen year olds
killed this woman last weekend in the French Quarter. Uh, luckily
their parents turned them in.
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Paul connects the expansion of the welfare state – Johnson‟s Great Society in the 1960‟s – to the
most frightening social problem in inner cities today – teenage black males murdering people
apparently without cause. Furthermore, Paul believes, “you don‟t have to have kids to get
welfare. You just have to prove you need it. I mean a couple could get. You don‟t necessarily
have to be a woman with kids.”
The welfare program in place today is much different than Aid for Dependent Children
(AFDC) instituted in 1935. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PROWRA) which changed the name and nature
of the federal government‟s major welfare program. The AFDC program in place in from 1935
to 1997 was transformed into Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). PROWRA
decreased the period of time during which families are eligible to receive government assistance
in the form of cash payments. Under TANF, recipients have a five year lifetime limit on
receiving welfare funds during which time they can receive cash aid for no longer than two
consecutive years. TANF gives block grants to states that must meet minimum requirements, but
are then free to be creative with aiding needy families temporarily. Only families with dependent
children receive cash aid in Louisiana. The goal has been to move recipients from welfare to
work.
Although the true success of PROWRA is often debated, the number of Louisianans
receiving cash assistance from the government has dropped from a monthly average of 280,177
people in fiscal 1990-1991 to 13,504 people in 2006-2007 (Waller 2008). The amount of cash
aid welfare recipients during LaBruzzo‟s time is less than 5% of what that number was during
Duke‟s time. The contrast in total spending on cash aid: $187.2 million in 1990-1991 and $16.5
million in 2006-2007 (Waller 2008). Although cash payments have been dramatically reduced in
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Louisiana, food stamp payments have remained constant. On the other hand, Medicaid rolls
have nearly doubled from 1997-1998 to 2006-2007, from 258,768 ($3.25 billion) to more than
1.5 million ($5.38 billion) (Waller 2008).
Under TANF, a single mother with two children receives $240 per month. A single
mother with six children receives $402 per month. The average grant in Louisiana is $200 per
month (Louisiana Department of Social Services 2008). Thus, six children are worth $24,120
over a seven year period (two years on, one year off, two years on, one year off, one year on).
Two children are worth $14,400 over a seven year period
Indeed, there are no lifetime limits on Food Stamps as long as one meets income and
other requirements. If there is an incentive to have children, then, it would have to come from
increased food stamp receipts. The maximum allotment for a single person household is $200 per
month (Louisiana Department of Social Services 2008). For a seven person household it is
$1052. Thus, by having six children, a mother can receive $852 more per month, albeit she will
have to feed her children. So, six children are worth $12,624 per year in Food Stamps. In total,
with six children, the most a single mother will receive is $17,448 for five years and $12,624
thereafter. She will not have all of this to spend however she likes because she must provide
food for her children or else she will not receive a check. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2008), the average consumer unit (comparable to household) has 2.5 members and
spends $6,022 on food per year. If we extrapolate average food consumption expenditures for
consumer units with 2.5 members to consumer units with 7 members, then we should expect that
consumer units with 7 members should spend $16,862 on food.
For the five years that a mother with six children receives TANF payments she will have
$586 dollars to spend however she chooses and the rest of the years that she has six dependents,
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she will run a deficit of $4,238, assuming she does not work. Thus, assuming the welfare mother
is a rational actor seeking to maximize her interests (as anti-welfare right-wing populists do
when they make the assumption that welfare incentivizes generational welfare-dependency), she
will not have six children in order to prevent having to work to make up the $4,238 deficit.
Misinterpreting Racial Composition of TANF Recipients
Beyond misunderstanding the lack of rationality behind the welfare-dependency
incentive frame, the respondents confuse the meaning of the fact that there are more whites on
welfare than blacks. For example, here is Paul‟s interpretation of Rep. LaBruzzo‟s sterilization
incentive.
…and that other thing about welfare. Nobody had the guts to ever
say that but it‟s true. There are more white people on welfare than
there are blacks. And the blacks got offended. Did you know there
are more whites on welfare than black people?
The fact that there are more whites on welfare than blacks nationally is used to counter any
charges of racism associated with LaBruzzo‟s rationale for his sterilization incentive. While half
of the respondents with an opinion on LaBruzzo‟s proposal (4/8) used the “more whites on
welfare than blacks frame,” none mentioned that whites make up 75% and African-Americans
comprise 12% of all Americans (see Table 7).
Although black families comprise a slightly smaller percentage of TANF recipients
nationally, they are disproportionately represented. From October 2005 to September 2006,
African-Americans accounted for 35.7% of all families receiving TANF funds, although they
comprise 12.2% of the total U.S. population (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
2006; Table 7). White families, on the other hand, make up 33.4% of all TANF families while
comprising 75.1% of the population (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2006;
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Table 7). Regarding the total number of individual adult TANF recipients, 37.2% are AfricanAmerican, while 37.9% are white (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2006).
In Louisiana, blacks make up a much higher percentage and are represented
disproportionately among TANF recipients. In Louisiana, African-Americans, who make up
32.3% of the population, comprise 78.8% of all families receiving TANF funds; whereas Whites,
who comprise 63.9% of the Louisiana population, account for 18.7% of TANF recipient families
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2006; Table 7).
The respondents kept LaBruzzo‟s proposal outside the “racist” category by asserting that
blacks are a minority percentage on the welfare rolls. However, a look at membership on the
welfare rolls by proportion of the population reveals overrepresentation among blacks and
therefore, proportional overexposure to programs affecting TANF recipients in the U.S. and
especially in Louisiana. Statistics that respondents did not use include the national
unemployment rate for blacks – 11.4% compared to 5.5% for whites (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2009) and the proportion of blacks with incomes below the poverty line – 25% relative
to 9% for whites (see Table 9).
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Elites
“Look where our country is. We‟re going socialist. We‟re going to the left under Barack Obama!
I think we need people who are willing to stand up and be courageous and say “hey look.
Enough is enough. This isn‟t what our country is founded upon.”
-Louisiana State Representative, John LaBruzzo
“Don‟t spread my wealth. Spread my work ethic.”
-Tax Day Tea Party Protestor, Metairie, LA

Theories of American Right-Wing Populism (Lipset 1970; Berlet and Lyons 2000) posit
that frustrated people in the middle - right-wing populists, target resentment towards those below
– unproductive welfare dependents, and above – unproductive elites. The classic target of
American populists, whether left-wing or right-wing has been Wall Street Bankers and corporate
elites (Berlet and Lyons 2000). Given that the U.S. is experiencing the largest recession since the
Great Depression, direct frustration with Wall Street Bankers and corporate elites was
hypothesized; however, considerably less resentment with financial and corporate elites was
found than expected. An example of what was hypothesized is Michelle‟s disgust with Wall
Street.
I think these big banks tell us how we‟re supposed to run the
country, like JP Morgan and Citibank and all of that. I think we all
need to take it back instead of letting them run the country like we
do. You know the Federal Reserve; it‟s banks. There is no, the
Federal Reserve is not the Federal government; it‟s banks. So, we
the people, for the people, who the people? The banks? I don‟t
know. I think things need to change and they will.
This is the classic populist explanation of the plight of the middle and working class: the
financial and industrial corporate elites use their money to subvert politicians to serve their
interests, rather than serving the interests of working men and women.
The interpretation of how and why this happens differs among left-wing and right-wing
populists. Historically, left-wing populists such as Louisiana‟s governors Huey P. Long, Earl K.
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Long and Edwin Edwards conclude that the rich must be taxed for such atrocities and,
symbolically put in their place. The rich must be taxed so the working men and women can have
a decent standard of living. Historically, right-wing populists such as David Duke, on the other
hand, either conclude that financial elites use the government to exploit the masses by
redistributing wealth through welfare-dependency or just blame the government. As a result the
mass of dependents do not question the subversion of the popular will because they receive a
check every month. Political elites line their pockets, while financial elites prosper. Meanwhile,
working men and women suffer.
Left-wing populists generally steer clear of cultural racism because of the large
proportion of minorities among the poor and unemployed whose support they need to stay in
office. On the other hand, cultural racial explanations are far from scant in right-wing populist
rhetoric. For example, David Duke (2009) writes about the Jews‟ “incredible ability to influence
Gentile politicians through both money and media. They have the power to bankroll a favorable
politician or blackmail him by threatening to support his opponent.”
This frame was not always salient among the respondents. While they blame the coalition
of unproductive welfare parasites and left-wing elites for their high taxes, they do not necessarily
connect this phenomenon to financial and corporate elites. Alternatively, the respondents explain
the coalition among the liberal elites and welfare parasites through party politics. Michelle
explains,
Democrats wanted to…tax everybody so that we could support the
people that couldn‟t afford to work because they had so many
children and stuff. And the Republicans didn‟t want to reward
them. So it‟s always just been a big tug-of-war you know.
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The most salient, elite target of the respondents is not Wall Street Bankers or corporate elites;
rather, it is Liberal Democratic Party Elites. As Paul, who believes all the news channels are
“very biased…except Fox” tells me,
Welfare was not meant to live on. Welfare was meant to help you
get back on your feet. Okay. But people have made a way of life
on it. It brings generations in the housing projects. Of course, the
politicians that were in at the time would constantly give to these
programs because most of these people were Democrats. And the
Democrats, they were beholden to the Democrats. So they keep
putting them back into the office to get their programs faster or
whatever. So, some of that has to change.
Among the respondents, the Wall Street Bankers have, for the most part, been overshadowed in
the producerist narrative by Democratic Party Elites – The Clintons, Barack Obama, etc.
Rather than blame Wall Street for the sub-prime lending crisis, the respondents with an
opinion on the matter framed government regulation as the culprit. For example, Lucy tells me
And they can blame it on Bush all they want, but if you look back
Bush is not the one who said, “hey, we have to mandate the
banking industry.” They had the mandate to where they had to give
people so many loans regardless of their credit and look where it
got us in the banking industry…Clinton is the one that did that one.
Forcing banks to write mortgages for sub-prime lenders is widely considered one cause of the
economic recession. Other reasons include deregulation such as the repeal of the Glass-Stegall
Act, substandard regulation of mortgage underwriters which resulted in overrated mortgages,
low interest rates and an economy overly dependent on consumption and under-reliant on
production. With an ideology that holds freedom from government intrusion sacrosanct in
addition to poverty as a result of laziness and poor decision-making, the respondents were apt to
blame working-class first time homebuyers rather than policies emanating from their own
ideology.
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Conclusions
Support for enticing welfare recipients with incentives for voluntary sterilization is more
ideological than empirical. In Louisiana, the number of cash assistance recipients has declined
95% since 1991 (Waller 2008). Although receiving food stamps and cash assistance, a welfare
mother is left with less than $600 to pay for other necessities throughout the year.
Notwithstanding these drastic changes, the respondents encourage a major reduction in the
welfare system.
This encouragement exists despite changes in socio-economic status and political
representation. Bucktown is now a mostly middle-class community above the national average
on many indicators of socio-economic status. In addition, Bucktonians have, for the most part,
disabused themselves of David Duke. Nowadays, their state representative is more business than
Klan.
Despite some shortcomings, theories of right-wing populism (Federici 1991; Berlet and
Lyons 2000) offer a convincing explanation for why ideological support for the voluntary
sterilization incentive exists. First, little variation exists in individualist attitudes among the
respondents – belief remains strong in an a priori social order featuring the rational pursuit of
self-interest. The belief in the good-natured free-will of (white) individuals is prominent in
Bucktonian frames. Government is viewed as the problem, not the solution, to poverty.
Second, All Bucktonians interviewed share a work ethic ideology, that is, they believe
society‟s problems can be fixed if we all work harder. Hard work, self-sufficiency and
determination were the most salient explanations for families‟ upward mobility. They all
attributed poverty to laziness, lack of thrift, or poor decision-making among individuals. Nearly
all respondents principally opposed giving able-bodied, mentally capable people something for
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nothing. The centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity of Rep. LaBruzzo‟s
generational welfare-dependency frame resonates with the work ethic ideology of all eight (8/9)
Bucktonians with opinions on the matter.
Third, the respondents framed poverty and welfare through the producerist narrative,
championing the productive against the unproductive to explain poverty and welfare, although a
greater emphasis was placed upon the lack of productivity among the poor rather than elites.
When respondents did express resentment toward elites, the salient target was government (i.e.
liberal political elites) rather than financial and corporate elites. Perhaps they do not demonize
financial and industrial corporate elites because they view them as hard-working Americans like
themselves, just more successful. Nonetheless, the focus of downward resentment remains on
unproductive minorities, especially lazy, impetuous, low-income, black welfare recipients.
Theories of right-wing populism (Federici 1991; Berlet and Lyons 2000) fall short of
explaining the critical case of Bucktown in three areas. The first two are discussed above: the
greater emphasis on downward resentment rather than upward resentment, as well as the focus of
upward resentment on government elites rather than financial and corporate industrial elites. The
third shortcoming arises when trying to explain opposition to Rep. LaBruzzo‟s policy suggestion.
While all eight respondents with an opinion on the sterilization incentive appealed to
producerism, opposed government economic intervention and demonized the poor for their lack
of work ethic, half (4/8) did not support the sterilization incentive. The opponents invoked
principles more salient than right-wing populism: religion (i.e. “I don‟t believe in birth control”),
anti-fascism (i.e. “It reminds me of Hitler”), and libertarian conservatism (i.e. “I don‟t want my
tax dollars going to that”). This suggests that right-wing populism in America, as characterized
by Federici (1991) and Berlet and Lyons (2000), needs to be further specified if it is to
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adequately explain the process through which middle and working-class whites come to support
repressive policies. Because the focus of downward resentment is often towards ethnic
minorities, drawing on theories of racism is one logical step forward. As the data suggest, there
is more than just a logical basis for extending theories of right-wing populism into theories of
racism.
Despite the existence of a right-wing populist frame to oppose the welfare system, the
respondents drew varying conclusions regarding how ethical or principled they considered Rep.
LaBruzzo‟s sterilization incentive. Supporters and opponents differed in four interrelated areas:
perception of whether the sterilization proposal actually presents a choice for the recipients, the
values they attached to their racial interpretation of the proposal, use of color-blind racial frames,
and perception of equality of opportunity.
Indeed there is a choice – you either take the $1000 dollars or you do not. What the
respondents disagree about is to what degree people in different social locations have agency in
deciding whether or not to accept $1000 in exchange for their reproductive rights. On one hand,
many respondents expressed that America is a meritocracy with formal equality and therefore
perceived a great degree of choice. On the other hand, they acknowledged the influence of
government and the culture of poverty in rendering welfare recipients pre-disposed to making
decisions that were not independent of government. Ultimately, although supporters appealed to
both agency and structure (i.e. government) throughout their discourse on the work ethic, welfare
and poverty, they invoked their perception of choice when they expressed support for the
sterilization incentive. Opponents generally accentuated structure to express opposition. Indeed,
the rationale for the sterilization incentive is wrought with similar contradictions. On one hand,
welfare recipients are viewed as oppressed by a government that keeps them poor and dependent,
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as well as by a culture of poverty that keeps them unemployed. On the other hand, the argument
goes, their individual failure keeps them on welfare and therefore dependent on tax payer dollars.
Although the respondents overwhelmingly interpreted LaBruzzo‟s proposal racially –
they recognized that it was targeted at low-income blacks – they differ on whether or not they
believe the proposal is “racist.” The respondents did not use statistical indicators to establish
Rep. LaBruzzo‟s “racist” intentions; rather, they relied on their personal experiences living in a
racially segregated area of the country to establish LaBruzzo‟s racial motivations. For example,
Andrew, an opponent, equates LaBruzzo‟s “racist” proposal with Hitler‟s coerced eugenics.
Alternatively, Lucy, a supporter, proclaims that LaBruzzo‟s proposal is not racist; rather, she
asserts that the fact blacks would be disproportionately exposed is merely a function of blacks
having lower incomes. Sometimes she frames their lower incomes as a lack of work ethic and
other times as a function of cultural defects.
While supporters and opponents alike used minimization to downplay the disparity in life
chances between whites and blacks, the three respondents that used the reverse discrimination
frame to explain this disparity all supported the proposal. The only respondent to assert that
equality of opportunity has not yet been realized was the most vehemently opposed to the
proposal.
In addition to their perceptions of choice, racial interpretations of LaBruzzo‟s sterilization
incentive, and views on equality opportunity, supporters and opponents were divided by their use
of color-blind racial frames. Put simply, supporters were more likely to explain poverty through
cultural racial frames, such as when Luke explained why he thinks LaBruzzo targeted blacks,
because they “are always having babies and staying home and not doing shit.” Opponents, on the
other hand, used non-racial explanations of poverty, namely a deficient work ethic.
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Limitations
This study has two major limitations. First, the sample is small. Interviewing more
participants could expose greater variation in attitudes towards welfare, poverty, blacks and
sterilization incentives. Although the core competency of qualitative methods is the depth it
provides as opposed to the generalizability of quantitative methods, an insufficient sample size
limits breadth of analysis. For example, there may be a segment of the Bucktown population that
believes equality of opportunity has not been realized, yet supports LaBruzzo‟s sterilization
proposal. Also, a larger sample size would allow for the possibility of examining relationships
between more variables.
Second, a more detailed examination of the social location of the respondents may help
account for variation in respondent attitudes toward welfare, comparative life chances for whites
and blacks, and sterilization incentives. This study is deficient in examining class, religion, age
and gender. Although I was able to gather basic information about class and status through
questions about upward mobility, a survey would better capture the degree of mobility of the
respondents by obtaining income levels and perhaps, more detailed job descriptions. Also, I
chose not to probe the respondents about religiosity unless they brought it up first. Probing the
respondents further could reveal how religious beliefs coincide with or contradict their attitudes
towards welfare, poverty and sterilization incentives. In addition, although the sample was
stratified by generation, age may not have been given sufficient attention as an independent
variable. Furthermore, a more critical investigation of gender may have explained why all three
female respondents supported the proposal.
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Suggestions for Future Research
This investigation of American anti-welfare right-wing populism is merely a starting
point for a more comprehensive study. Future research should derive from this study a basic
idea of what variables increase the likelihood of support for sterilization incentives. These
include minimization of discrimination, the belief that equality of opportunity has been surpassed
by minority set-asides, lack of reflexivity about one‟s racial ideology, the belief that programs
that target the reproductive rights of those who are structurally disadvantaged are not racist, and
the belief that sterilization incentives do not disproportionately target low-income blacks.
Furthermore, such an investigation should in some way gauge respondents‟ knowledge of the
current state of welfare programs to determine the degree to which this variable affects welfare
attitudes.
Before progressing to a more comprehensive investigation, this study of anti-welfare
right-wing populism should be further verified by interviewing more respondents. This expanded
study of anti-welfare right-wing populism must have a more purposefully selected sample,
specifically to examine class differences. Also, interview questions should probe respondents
about religiosity and directly examine elite resentment, rather than just letting these issues bubble
up in conversation.
Implications
The case has been made that Bucktown is not the “average” American suburban
neighborhood; however, one of the most glaring unanswered questions throughout this
investigation is where Bucktonians fit into mainstream American politics. Bucktonians who
support Representative LaBruzzo‟s proposal seem to be members of the “Silent Majority” of
white working-class swing-voters often referred to as “Reagan Democrats” (Teixiera and Rogers
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2000). All but one supporter of the sterilization proposal has no more than a high school
education and works in a non-managerial or professional job with lesser autonomy than middleclass counterparts who are more likely to have a college degree. In addition to the changing
demographic make-up of their home town, they are experiencing the rise of ethnic minorities
into the highest levels of government along with increased government expenditures. While
dollars and cents arguments against the welfare state have lost legitimacy since 1996, right-wing
populists cling to their producerist framework of social inequality. A central theme to their
personal narratives is hard work. The respondents‟ pride was palpable as they expressed the
sacrifices they have made to ensure a decent standard of living for their families.
In the 2008 Presidential Election, the majority was not completely silent. Sarah Palin was
chosen to run for Vice President to appeal to Joe Six Pack and Joe the Plumber, despite Teixeira
and Rogers‟ (2000) warning that the silent majority would more resemble Joe/Jane
Serviceperson. Thus, it was no great surprise that the Bucktonian respondents did not strongly
support Governor Palin. Indeed, respondents did not espouse strong loyalties to any politicians in
the 2008 Presidential Election (except for one respondent who liked John Edwards because of his
idea to reform welfare, until news spread of his marital infidelity). Because all respondents who
identified as political voted for McCain, it is safe to assume that if Bucktonians alone were the
swing vote, John McCain would be president today. The failure of John McCain‟s Presidential
campaign despite Bucktonian support illuminates diversity within the “Silent Majority.” Despite
some respondents‟ socio-economic compatibility with “Reagan Democrats” demographics,
Bucktonians should not be labeled swing voters.
It is quite clear that Republicans will need new frames to recapture the “Silent Majority”
in future elections; however, Bucktonians do not make up a section of the population to capture.
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Rather, they are a segment to maintain. Although producerists traditionally reject the Republican
Party‟s connections to big business, Bucktonians were more concerned about the lack of
production among the lower class. Their version of producerism is quite compatible with
Republican interests, especially restricted government intervention in the economy. With a focus
on the work ethic, pre-occupation with disparities in racial sub-cultures, and concern about the
subversion of the popular will through government instead of through industrial corporate and
financial interests, these Bucktonians seem quite likely to remain loyal Republicans in the
coming years.
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Tables 1: Comparison of Income in the U.S., Louisiana, Jefferson Parish, and Bucktown

Table 1 Income In 2008 Dollars
Region
United States
Income

Louisiana

Jefferson Parish

Bucktown

e

1989

1999

1989

1999

1989

1999

1989

1999

Mean Household Income

$66,985

$73,609

$51,464

$58,324

$59,513

$65,872

$56,160

$65,560

Median Household Income

$51,643

$63,948

$37,713

$51,355

$47,966

$59,460

N/A

N/A

91,993,582

105,539,122

1,498,371

1,657,107

166,255

176,424

1,842

1,800

Households

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990)
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000b)
Sahr (2009); conversion from 1989 to 2008 U.S. dollars: 0.582; conversion from 1999 to 2008 U.S. dollars: 0.782
Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2000)
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Table 2: Comparison of Income in the U.S., Louisiana, Jefferson Parish, and Bucktown

Table 2 Percent Change in Income in 2008 Dollars
Region
United States

Louisiana

Jefferson Parish

Bucktowne

Mean Household Income

9.9%

13.3%

10.7%

16.7%

Median Household Income

23.8%

36.2%

24.0%

N/A

Households

14.7%

10.6%

6.1%

-2.3%

Income

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990)
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000b)
Sahr (2009); conversion from 1989 to 2008 U.S. dollars: 0.582; conversion from 1999 to 2008 U.S. dollars: 0.782
Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2000)
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Table 3: Comparison of Educational Attainment in the U.S., Louisiana, Jefferson Parish,
and Bucktown

Table 3
United States
Educational
Attainment
Less than High
school
High school graduate
Some College
Associates
Bachelors
Graduate Degree
N

Educational Attainment for the Population 25+
Region
Louisiana
Jefferson Parish

1990

2000

1990

2000

1990

2000

24.76%
29.99%
18.74%
6.16%
13.11%
7.22%
158,868,436

19.61%
28.63%
21.05%
6.32%
15.54%
8.86%
182,211,639

31.69%
31.66%
17.25%
3.27%
10.53%
5.60%
2,536,994

25.19%
32.40%
20.23%
3.45%
12.24%
6.49%
2,775,468

24.01%
31.87%
20.80%
4.55%
12.76%
6.00%
283,003

20.74%
29.97%
23.37%
4.43%
14.51%
6.98%
298,761

Bucktown
1990
16.2%
33.6%
22.7%
5.0%
14.9%
7.6%
3,001

c

2000
13.21%
25.16%
27.00%
4.90%
18.94%
10.81%
2,878

a. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990)
b. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
c. Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2000)
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Table 4: Comparison of Educational Attainment in the U.S., Louisiana, Jefferson Parish,
and Bucktown
Table 4
Educational
Attainment
Less than High
school
High school graduate
Some College
Associates
Bachelors
Graduate Degree
N

Change in Educational Attainment for the Population 25+
Region
United States

Louisiana

Jefferson Parish

Bucktownc

-20.82%
-4.53%
12.30%
2.54%
18.51%
22.64%
14.69%

-20.50%
2.32%
17.28%
5.39%
16.28%
15.90%
9.40%

-13.63%
-5.97%
12.35%
-2.69%
13.68%
16.40%
5.57%

-18.26%
-25.09%
19.16%
-2.62%
26.87%
41.66%
-4.10%

a. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990)
b. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
c. Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2000)
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Table 5: Comparison of Occupations in the U.S., Louisiana, Jefferson Parish, and
Bucktown
Table 5 Occupation by Region for population 16+ 1990-2000
Region
United States
Occupation
Executive,
administrative, and
managerial
Professional
specialty
occupations
Technical, sales,
and administrative
support
Service occupations
Farming, forestry,
and fishing
occupations
Precision
production, craft,
and repair
Operators,
fabricators, and
laborers
N

Louisiana

Jefferson Parish

Bucktownc

1990

2000

1990

2000

1990

2000

1990

2000

12.3%

13.5%

10.4%

10.8%

12.4%

12.8%

15.9%

16.9%

14.1%

20.2%

14.0%

19.1%

14.0%

19.7%

15.5%

24.8%

31.7%

26.7%

31.5%

26.8%

38.4%

29.9%

40.7%

27.6%

13.2%

14.9%

14.2%

16.7%

11.9%

15.3%

9.3%

14.7%

2.5%

0.7%

2.5%

0.8%

1.0%

0.4%

0.8%

0.6%

11.3%

9.4%

12.5%

11.7%

11.1%

10.6%

12.9%

7.5%

14.9%

14.6%

14.8%

14.1%

11.2%

11.3%

4.8%

7.9%

191,829,271

217,168,077

3,119,293

3,394,546

340,939

354,056

3,433

3,242

a. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990)
b. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
c. Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2000)
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Table 6: Comparison of Occupations in the U.S., Louisiana, Jefferson Parish, and
Bucktown

Table 6 Change in Occupation by Region for
population 16+ 1990-2000
Region
United States

Louisiana

Jefferson Parish

Bucktownc

9.4%

3.8%

2.6%

6.2%

Professional specialty
occupations

43.3%

36.1%

40.7%

59.7%

Technical, sales, and
administrative support

-15.9%

-15.0%

-22.0%

-32.1%

Service occupations

12.4%

17.2%

28.8%

58.0%

Farming, forestry, and
fishing

-70.1%

-66.8%

-57.1%

-19.7%

Precision production,
craft, and repair

-16.6%

-6.7%

-4.7%

-42.1%

Operators, fabricators,
and laborers

-1.6%

-4.8%

0.7%

62.2%

N

13.2%

8.8%

3.8%

-5.6%

Occupation
Executive,
administrative, and
managerial

a. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990)
b. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
c. Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990, 2000)
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Table 7: Comparison of Racial and Ethnic Composition in the U.S., Louisiana, Jefferson
Parish, and Bucktown

Table 7 Race and Ethnicity by Region
Region
Race or Ethnicity
White alone
Black or African
American alone
Asian alone
Other (includes two or
more)
N
Hispanic or Latinoc

United
States
211,353,725
75.10%
34,361,740
12.21%
10,171,820
3.61%
25,534,621
9.07%
281,421,906

Louisiana
2,855,964
63.91%
1,444,566
32.32%
55,492
1.24%
112,954
2.53%
4,468,976

Jefferson
Parish
317,948
69.81%
104,025
22.84%
13,790
3.03%
19,703
4.33%
455,466

Bucktownb
3670
95.47%
36
0.94%
74
1.93%
64
1.66%
3,844

35,238,481
12.52%

107,854
2.41%

32,227
7.08%

119
3.10%

a. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
b. Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02
c. Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990,
2000)
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Table 8: Comparison of Public Assistance Income in the U.S., Louisiana, Jefferson
Parish, and Bucktown

Table 8 Population Receiving Public Assistance Income
Region
United States

Louisiana

Jefferson Parish

Bucktown

b

With public
assistance income
No public
assistance income

3,629,732

3.4%

54,646

3.3%

4,535

2.6%

11

0.6%

101,909,390

96.6%

1,602,461

96.7%

171,889

97.4%

1789

99.4%

N

105,539,122

100.0%

1,657,107

100.0%

176,424

100.0%

1800

100.0%

a. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
b. Combination of Census Tract 201.01 and Census Block Group 2, 201.02 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990,
2000)
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Table 9: Comparison of Poverty Status by Race and Ethnicity in the U.S., Louisiana, and
Jefferson Parish

Table 9 Poverty Status by Race and Ethnicity by Region for
the population 16+
Region
Race

United States

Louisiana

Jefferson Parish

White

9.14%

11.13%

8.45%

Black
N

24.90%
238,973,992

36.69%
4,169,716

29.48%
417,832

a.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2000a)
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Figure 1: Map of Bucktown and surrounding area

a.

Source: Google Maps 2009
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Figure 2: Map of Bucktown

a.

Source: Google Maps 2009
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Figure 3: Photo of White Power and Swastika painted on the road in
front of 1500 Homestead Ave. in May 2009

a. photo by Matt S. Landry 2009
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Appendix A: Interview Guide
My name is Matt Landry. I grew up on Lakeshore Dr. for over twenty years. I am a graduate
student in Sociology at the University of New Orleans. I am interviewing Bucktonians about
their political beliefs for my thesis.
I Bucktown - General
1) How long have you lived in Bucktown?
a) What do you like about Bucktown? Why did you move here? (or why did you stay
here?)
b) What do you dislike about Bucktown? Is there anything hard about living here?
c) Can you talk to me about how Bucktown has changed since you moved here?
II Labruzzo‟s Proposal
2) There‟s been a lot of talk about John Labruzzo in the media lately. Please tell me what you
think about him.
3) Please tell me what you think about his public announcement about giving $1,000 to lowincome people to get their tubes tied and to give money to more affluent, more educated for
having kids?
III Poverty and Welfare
4) In general, would you mind talking about your views on welfare?
-would you say welfare programs are effective? (only if necessary)
5) From your perspective, why are people poor?
6) When people are poor, what do you think the government should do?
7) Do you think there is equality of opportunity for all people?
8) Do you think programs like affirmative action take away from equality of opportunity?
9) Do you think there‟s a lot of reverse discrimination today?
10) Was there ever a time when you or your family needed help?
11) What did your parents or grandparents teach you about your responsibility to provide for
your family?
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12) Would you say that the way you look welfare has changed much throughout your life? If so,
what circumstances changed the way you looked at welfare?
13) How did you come to know about how welfare programs work?
14) If your unmarried daughter/sister/granddaughter had a kid and didn‟t have money, what do
you think she would get from the government?
IV 2008 Election
15) What candidate did you like in the 2008 presidential election?
16) Was there any candidate that you particularly disliked?
17) It seems that people had completely opposite views on Sarah Palin during the recent election
season. What do you think about Sarah Palin?
18) It seems like there has been a lot of focus on race during the 2008 election leading up to
President Obama‟s inauguration. What do you think about the media‟s emphasis on race during
the election season and leading up to the inauguration?
V Elites
19) In your opinion, why do you think we are in a recession?
20) What do you think of the bailout?
particularly that people say we‟re giving money to banks in exchange for little to
nothing?
VI Duke
21) I grew up in Bucktown and I remember a lot of controversy surrounding David Duke being
elected into office. What did/do you think of David Duke and his policies?
22) Do you think David Duke spoke for many people in Bucktown?
VI Immigration
23) After Katrina, a lot of immigrants moved to New Orleans and Jefferson Parish. I talk to a lot
of people who are frustrated about the Hispanic and Mexican immigrants moving here. What do
you think of them?
24) There‟s been a lot of talk about immigration reform over the past few years. What do you
think about the current immigrant situation in America today?
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VII Globalism
25) It seems like the country is divided over what America‟s role should be abroad. For
example, there was a lot of discrepancy about what whether America should invade Iraq. And
now America is divided about whether we should leave Iraq or not. Do you think America
should get involved in places like Iraq?
26) It seems that people are divided on what they think about the United Nations. What do you
think about the United Nations?
VIII Ending Questions
27) What class would you say you belong to? Would you say that you have always been a
member of that class? What class would you say most Bucktonians belong to?
28) Is there anything else you would like to mention about Bucktown and its politics?
29) Could you tell me about a life lesson that has been important to you?
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Appendix B: Institutional Review Board Approval Form
University Committee for the Protection
of Human Subjects in Research
University of New Orleans
______________________________________________________________________
Campus Correspondence
Principal Investigator:

Vern Baxter

Co-Investigator:

Matt Landry

Date:

December 9, 2008

Protocol Title:

“Ideology Formation Among Bucktown Residents”

IRB#:

08Nov08

The IRB has deemed that the research and procedures are compliant with the University of Ne w
Orleans and federal guidelines. The above referenced human subjects protocol has been
reviewed and approved using expedited procedures (under 45 CFR 46.116(a) categories 6&7).
Approval is only valid for one year from the approval date. Any changes to the procedures or
protocols must be reviewed and approved by the IRB prior to implementation. Use the IRB
number listed on this letter in all future correspondence regarding this proposal.
If an adverse, unforeseen event occurs (e.g., physical, social, or emotional harm), you are
required to inform the IRB as soon as possible after the event.
Best wishes on your project!
Sincerely,

Robert D. Laird, Chair
UNO Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research
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VITA
Matt Landry was born in Metairie, LA in 1983 and received his B.G.S. from the
University of New Orleans in 2006. He will graduate with an M.A. in Sociology at the
University of New Orleans in August 2009. His future plans include pursuing his Ph.D. at the
University of Pittsburgh.
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